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Abstract 
 
This paper addresses population movement in Indonesia within the broader contexts of human 
development. Human movement, voluntary and involuntary, is a reflection of the people 
initiatives and responses to the changing nature of society and economy. As a large archipelagic 
state, movement of people across the country, historically, has always an important dimension of 
social formation in Indonesia. The paper however focuses on movement of people in the last four 
decades. It aims to examine the connection between migration and its wider social and economic 
contexts, looking at how politics shape migration policy and in turn, how migration affects 
policy making. The paper discusses at length recent issues of overseas labor migration, 
particularly on the apparently embedded inertia within the policy making processes. The 
continuing incidences of irregular migration, forced migration and human trafficking obviously 
mirror the incapacity of the state in properly managing the movement of people. The insufficient 
data and information generally hampered any conclusive linkages of migration and human 
development. With or without state’s proper policies people will continuously on the move 
enriching human development in Indonesia.  
 









The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 





Human beings are constantly on the move, transgressing social and spatial boundaries to 
expand their capabilities and entitlements in order to improve their welfare. In some 
circumstances, however, human movements also reflect the people‟s response to constraint 
in fulfilling their choices, as seen in the various form of forced migration. Forced migration 
constitutes a desperate situation in which a voluntary choice to move is curtailed. This 
report assesses human movement in Indonesia, both the voluntary and involuntary types of 
migration, as a reflection of the people initiatives and responses to the changing nature of 
society and economy.  In this report, migration issues in the last four decades will be the 
focus of the review. It aims to examine the connection between migration and its wider 
social and economic contexts, looking at how politics shape migration policy and in turn, 
how migration affects policy making. 
The content of this report is divided into five parts. The first part is a historical 
overview of migration and its contribution to the formation of Indonesian society. In this 
first part, migration is seen as part of the social changes, emphasizing the important role of 
“traditional ethnic movement‟, before, during and after, the colonial period. Indonesia is 
diverse in term of ethnicity, religion and culture. Human movement is increasingly play 
important role in influencing the diversity of the country and therefore critical in the nation-
state building process. The second part devoted specifically to the state‟s demographic 
engineering policies in relocating people from Java and Bali to other islands in the 
archipelago. The politics of this migration policy, its achievements and the social and 
political consequences will be highlighted. In the third part, based on the available statistics 
on migration between regions in Indonesia, human movement will be seen in the context of 
regional development, particularly during and after the New Order developmental state 
regime. 
The fourth and the fifth parts of this report will look at the increasingly important 
migration phenomena in Indonesia, namely international migration. In the fourth part, 
movement of people crossing the state‟s borders, become the alternative source of income 
for Indonesian migrant workers since the beginning of the 1980s. In this part, apart from 
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showing the statistics related to international migration, attention will be given on the 
political contexts of the making and unmaking of overseas migration policy. Particular 
attention will also be given to the way the systematic exploitation occurred and the cost of 
migration, both economic and social, that have to paid by the migrants. An increasing 
important issue related to internal migration is the vulnerability of migrant workers in a 
time of global financial crisis. The fifth part of this report will explores to the impact of 
financial crisis in 1997-1998 and 2008-2009 on the livelihood of migrant workers and its 
family. The final part of this paper is a conclusion where lesson learned and policy 




Movement of People and Formation of Society  
 
Indonesia, an archipelago located between Asia and Australia, is currently the fourth largest 
country in the world in term of the size of population (See Map of Indonesia). The 
population in 2008 is estimated more than 230 million, geographically distributed into 34 
provinces and more than 450 districts. It is estimated that more than 6 million Indonesian 
living abroad, mostly as migrant workers. Indonesia has a diverse human development as 
indicated in the stark differences between provinces with the highest (Jakarta, North 
Sulawesi and East Kalimantan) and the lowest (Papua, West Nusa Tenggara and East Nusa 
Tenggara) human development index (Table 1.1). Ethnically and religiously Indonesia is a 
diverse country, reflecting a long process of social transformation that continuously took 
place through human movement in this archipelago (Table 1.2, Figure 1.1, Table 1.3 and 
Figure 1.2). The current demographic configuration of Indonesia constitutes demographic 
dynamics, resulted from the changes in the fertility, mortality and migration, and the social 
processes in which different collective identities, interacting and creating new cultural 
identities. Human move within culture as only through web of cultural values and social 




The Dutch historians, Vollenhoven and van Leur, as quoted by Hugo (1980: 97) 
summarized patterns of migration during pre-colonial Indonesia as being of three main 
types: (1) colonization by large groups of migrants from one region who settled in another 
region, (2) migration of individuals, particularly traders, who settled in port cities, (3) 
establishment of authority in foreign regions. From the sixteenth century up until the latter 
part of the nineteenth century there was a gradual increase in the number of Europeans, 
whose activities had much influence on the pattern of migration in Indonesia.  According to 
1930 population census, 11.5 percent of the total indigenous population of Indonesia was 
living outside their district to birth. It was interesting that large number of Java-born 
Indonesians were enumerated in the other islands. Pelzer (1945:189) calculated that 
967,000 Javanese, 120,000 Sundanese, 16,000 Madurese and 39,000 other Indonesians of 
Java ancestries, were found in the other islands, and not all of them were Java-born.  
Before independence, two factors contributed to movement of people from Java to 
the other islands. First, the increase of the Dutch plantations in the other islands were 
labour was scarce led planters to recruit people from Java. The first group recruited were 
Chinese coolies, but later Javanese and Sundanese workers were also recruited. Secondly, 
in 1905, the Dutch government considered Java to be overpopulated and introduced its 
colonization program to resettle people from Java in the “Outer Islands”. However, the 
concentration of colonial activity in Java also led to a number of growing urban centers, 
such as Batavia, Surabaya and Semarang. According to Pelzer (1945: 175) these cities 
attracted people from the crowded interior because of the employment opportunities they 
offered. Hugo (1980: 114) argued that migration played a key role in the growth of urban 
centers during the colonial period. Although a significant proportion of urban dwellers were 
immigrants from overseas, in-migrants from rural areas and the other islands made up a 
majority among the indigenous urban population. During the colonial period, besides 
movement  due to the impact of colonization, there was also large scale migration by 
people from the highly mobile ethnic groups, such as the Minangkabau, Bugis, Banjarese 
and Makasarese. 
During World War II (1942-1945) Indonesia was occupied by the Japanese. Little is 
known about population movement because no data was available during this time. The 
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only evidence was that the Japanese initiated a forces labour (romusha) recruitment system, 
which resulted in many Javanese being sent to the other islands or other countries in 
Southeast Asia; many of them never returned. After independence, Indonesian government 
reinstituted the colonization program under the name of transmigration and the first 
transmigrants were settled in Lampung (South Sumatera) in 1950.  From the early 1950s 
anthropologists and sosiologists paid more attention to the migration of selected ethnic 
group. The principal theme which emerged from these studies of the mobility of ethnic 
groups was that the pattern of mobility exhibited were apparently due to a tradition of 
migration or to traditional pressures whithin these ethnic groups. These studies tend to 
consider that forces behind migration of these ethnic groups are more or less constant. 
Forbes (1981: 61) however argued that forces producing this ethnic migration were 
constantly changing. Some forces (e.g. political unrest) were only significant at particular 
periods, others (ecological, demographic, economic, educational, urban attractions) 
increased steadily in significance, while others (geographical and social-systemic) remained 
constant throughout the period or declined in significance. 
McNicoll (1968: 37) based on the 1961 census birth place data and the 1964-1965 
National Sample Survey; found that South Sulawesi showed the greatest internal mobility, 
followed by North Sumatera and South Sumatera. The last two regions were also prime 
recipients of migrants. Regions of particular stability were west Nusatenggara and Bali, 
while Central Sumatera was important as a region of out migration only. The proportions of 
out migrants from West and Central Java were comparatively large, due to urban migration 
to Jakarta. In 1961, rural Sumatera, Kalimantan and Maluku contained the largest 'external' 
population. In Sumatera and Kalimantan the in-migrants were transmigrants mainly from 
Java, while in Maluku the majority were from Sulawesi. At the other extreme, the rural 
areas showing the fewest in-migrants relative to their population and the least internal 
mobility were in East and Central Java, Nusatenggara and Central Sulawesi. The reason for 
rural to urban population movement besides seeking a better life in urban areas is also 
caused by the feelings of insecurity due to political instability in some rural areas, most 
notably Darul Islam rebellion in West Java.   
According to the 1971 census, nearly five percent of the total population had 
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migrated from their province of birth and another 1.2 per cent had changed their province 
of residence more than once. The most important stream of migration (nearly 40 percent of 
the total net life-time migration) was that flowing into Jakarta from all other provinces. 
About-four-fifths of this migration was from other provinces in Java. Although the 
population of Jakarta was one-third of the urban population of Java, about two-thirds of all 
migrants to urban areas ended up in Jakarta (Sundrum, 1976 : 90). According to Speare 
(1975: 79) the second largest stream of migration was that flowing into Lampung, Jambi 
and Riau. The percentage born outside those provinces was 36,16 and 13 respectively. The 
rest of the inter-provincial migration was to provinces experiencing high rates of economic 
development in recent times, such as East Kalimantan where there were timber and oil 
industries. Speare indicated that interprovincial migrants are more likely to settle in urban 
areas than in rural areas. Fifty-five per cent of all migrants between 1966 and 1971 were 
living in urban areas in 1971.   
The most comprehensive study about voluntary migration of highly mobile ethnic 
groups, is probably, the work of Naim (1979). He made an intensive study about why, 
where the Minangkabau migrate (merantau), and the consequences upon the place of origin 
and the place destination. According to Naim, Merantau as a type of migration behaviour is 
unique. It is a voluntary movement, usually leaving one's cultural territory whether for a 
short or long time, with the aim of earning a living or seeking further knowledge or 
experience. In the migration literature merantau is considered as temporary migration or 
circulation because the migrants have the intention of returning home. Naim (1979: 51-56) 
compared the migration volume of some of the most highly mobile ethnic groups since 
1930. In 1930, the percentage of migrants among the Bawean was the largest (35.9 
percent), followed by the Bataks (15.3 percent), the Banjarese (14.2 percent) and the 
Minangkabau (11 percent). The projected migrant population in 1961 showed that the 
Bawean is still the most mobile (31.6 percent), foolowed by the Minangkabau (31.6 
percent), the Bataks (19.5 percent) and the Banjarese (12.22 percent). In 1971, the projected 
Minangkabau migrants was 44 percent, probably the highest among the ethnic groups in 
Indonesia. 
The island of Sulawesi is also the homeland of several of Indonesia's most 
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peripatetic ethnic groups. The Bugis, The Makasarese and the Torajan are the three largest 
ethnic groups in the province of South Sulawesi. Lineton (1975) showed that out-migration 
has a long history among these ethnic groups. The fact that the Bugis have been migrating 
for centuries, in itself, is a factor predisposing other Bugis to leave their native land since 
the Bugis colonies abroad are a source of information about more favourable economic 
opportunities elsewhere and often provide both financial and moral assistance to the would-
be migrant. The success of many former migrants arouses aspirit of emulation in those who 
have remained behind. Migration is seen to be a means, for many people the only means, to 
achieve wealth and a higher social status (Lineton, 1975: 190-191). There is also substantial 
Bugis movement within South Sulawesi, including seasonal circular migration between 
village and the provincial capital city of Ujung Pandang. Much of this rural-urban 
movement also has a seasonal rhytm and involve the Makasarese and the Torajans as well. 
The population of Indonesia (Table 3.1) for three decades, from 1971 to 2000 have 
rapidly grown from 119.3 million to 203.9 million. For three decades, the population of 
Indonesia mainly concentrated in Java, now comprises around 60 percent of the total 
population of Indonesia, decrease from 73.8 percent in 1971 to 60.8 percent in 2000. Apart 
from Jakarta and West Java, other provinces in Java have relatively low population growth, 
presumably indicating high rate of out-migration, especially from Central and East Java 
provinces (Table 3.2). The movement of people from Java to the other islands most notably 
through emigration policy under the Dutch, and continue by the Indonesian government 
under transmigration policy. Apart from the result of emigration and transmigration 
policies, the Javanese being the largest ethnic group in Indonesia significantly the most 
mobile ethnic group. In 2000 the Javanese not only demographically dominant group in 
Java but also in provinces outside Java, such as Lampung, North Sumatra, East Kalimantan, 
Jambi and South Sumatra (Table 1.4 and Figure 1.4). Indonesia‟s national motto, unity in 








Emigration as an attempt by the colonial government to move people from Java to the other 
islands is considered to be the least successful measure of the Ethical policy. The first 
organized attempt in this direction was made in 1905 when, as an experiment, an 
agricultural colony called Gedong Tataan, was set up in Lampung (South Sumatra). By 
1930, the colonists numbered thirty thousand. Efforts to settle Javanese farmers in the 
south-east of Kalimantan and Sulawesi met with failure. The situation improved somewhat 
during the 1930s when, as a result of more skilful propaganda, better selection methods, 
and more extensive preparatory work in the areas of settlement, more farmers could be 
induced to leave.  
Heeren (1979:10-15) divided Dutch resettlement policy (1905-1941) into three 
broad phases. First, there was the Experimental Phase (1905-1911). The assumption 
adopted during this phase was that new settlements should, as far as possible, resemble 
villages in Java. Up to 1911, only about 4,818 Javanese had been moved to Lampung.   
Second, came the period of the Credit Bank of Lampung (1911-1928). The government 
established a Credit Bank of Lampung in March 1911 to provide 22.5 gulden as a migration 
premium to every migrant family, in addition to a maximum of 300 gulden, given as credit. 
This amount had to be repaid by the migrants after three years with 9 per cent per annum 
interest. Migrants could borrow additional money for the purchase of, for example, 
livestock, agricultural equipment or building materials. Since the majority of the migrants 
did not have any experience of banks, problems of repayment were inevitable. Many used 
the money for unproductive purposes, such as for clothing or festivities (slametan), or even 
for alcohol or drugs (candu).  
The government commenced the third phase of the emigration policy, known as the 
Bawon system. The Bawon system was initially devised to meet the needs of migrants in 
Lampung for labor to harvest their rice. Under the Bawon system, the government only 
provided land for the migrants. They were to pay back their own fares within two or three 
years of settlement. The government usually moved them into Lampung from Java during 
harvest time, around February-March, so that they could be hired immediately by earlier 
migrants. Their wages were paid in kind, in the form of rice. In Java their share of the 
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harvest typically was one-tenth; in Lampung, they could earn as much as one-seventh or 
one-fifth of the harvest. From this they paid their debts and started a new life as colonists in 
Lampung. The Bawon system was considered the most successful emigration program of 
the Dutch period, moving large numbers at relatively low cost.  
Among the new national leaders, Hatta (1954:169-170) argued most forcefully that 
emigration should be continued after Independence. However, the idea of 'transmigration' 
as proposed by Hatta was somewhat different from the colonization policy implemented by 
the Dutch. Transmigration was to be implemented in conjunction with the industrialization 
outside Java. However, the idea of industrialization as the backbone of Hatta's 
transmigration policy proved unattainable. As Wertheim observed in 1956, the difference 
between the Dutch and the Indonesian resettlement policy had nothing to do with 
industrialization. In the period 1956-1960, the government formulated, for the first time, a 
Five-Year Development Plan, in which transmigration was described as an instrument to: 
reduce population pressure in Java; provide labor in the sparsely populated provinces; and 
support military strategy, as well as to accelerate the process of assimilation 
(Hardjosudarmo, 1965: 128-129).  
Partly as the result of regional rebellions in West Sumatra and South and North 
Sulawesi during the period 1956-58, transmigration gained a new aim as a strategic 
instrument to strengthen national integration and security. The increasing role of military 
leaders in the government bureaucracy played an important part in establishing the strategic 
aims of transmigration. Up to the time of the attempted coup of 1965, although the total 
number of people who were moved under these schemes was very small, some resettlement 
areas were designed to bolster the national defense, particularly during the dispute with 
Malaysia. In the 1950s and 1960s transmigration was always ambitiously planned, but its 
implementation was consistently poor. Expertise and funds were chronically limited. 
However, the long-lasting perceptions that have valued transmigration as a multi-purpose 
instrument may also have mystified transmigration as a 'panacea', a cure for many diseases. 
In the New Order period, such perceptions have apparently been maintained. This helps to 
explain many controversies about the implementation of transmigration policy during the 
New Order (1967-1997). The number of families resettled under transmigration program in 
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this period, see Table 2.1 and 2.2. 
In the First Plan (1969-1973), although the problem of population redistribution was 
mentioned, it was not elaborated, however, the need to meet labor requirements for 
development in the regions outside Java, although stated as a secondary goal, was given 
more detailed attention in the plan. It seems that the economist-technocratic views that 
considered transmigration primarily an instrument to support the immediate objectives of 
stabilization and rehabilitation strongly influenced the formulation of the plan. The 
transmigration program was considered as an important source of labor to serve these 
broader goals. In addition, the transmigration program was expected to increase food 
production outside Java.  In the First Plan no numerical targets for transmigration were set. 
This was probably because of difficulties in obtaining reliable aggregate data, a major 
problem for the planners who prepared that document. In addition, the focus of 
transmigration seemed to be more on regional development than on solving the problem of 
uneven population distribution between Java and the other islands.  
Prior to the Second Plan (1974-1978), there was some hope, particularly among 
economic observers, that the plan would be prepared in a more systematic way, based on 
research and the cooperation of a large number of economic experts. But, as Glassburner 
(1978: 167) argued, as a result of the rice crisis and the radical impact of changing oil 
prices meant that Widjojo Nitisastro, the head of Bappenas, and his subordinates could not 
prepare a comprehensive plan. The plan, according to Glassburner, was no more than a 
statement of qualitative objectives. Although the demographic rationale for transmigration 
was only implicitly stated in the plan, a numerical target was explicitly mentioned. The 
target was to move 250,000 families within five years. In 1974, the Minister of Manpower 
and Transmigration, explained that the resettlement of large numbers of people from Java, 
Bali and Lombok would make a positive contribution to regional development outside Java. 
In selecting the sending areas, priority was to be given to regions that were considered 
'critical', such as areas prone to flooding, and to rural places with population densities of 
more than 1,000 persons per square kilometers. South Sumatra, South and East Kalimantan, 
and South, Central and Southeast Sulawesi were designated as the main receiving areas for 
transmigration settlement. In 1974 the World Bank began to support transmigration 
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program in Lampung, in southern part of Sumatra. 
Although the numerical achievement of the Second Plan was far below the target, 
the Third Plan (1979-1983) surprisingly increased the target into 500,000 households. The 
reason for increasing the target, apart from the general euphoria occasioned by the second 
oil boom, was the economist-technocrats' feeling that the implementation of the program 
would be improved by the increased support being given by many foreign donor agencies. 
The second World Bank-assisted transmigration project began in 1979, concentrating on 
the resettlement of transmigrants in dry-land areas along the new Trans-Sumatra highway. 
Technical assistance was also provided to the Junior Minister for Transmigration to aid in 
co-ordination of the overall program. Such assistance was important, given that lack of co-
ordination was considered to have been the major problem in the implementation of 
transmigration under the Second Plan. The focus of the second round of World Bank 
projects on dry-land and food-crop transmigration schemes also reflects an important new 
development. It was a significant departure from the Bank's successful first project on tree-
crop transmigration schemes. The change constituted an important development in the 
evolution of World Bank involvement on transmigration for at least two reasons. First, the 
World Bank had failed to influence the policy makers in directing transmigration policy 
into more market-oriented types of population settlements. Second, although the economist-
technocrat group had played a larger role in reshaping transmigration policy into the so-
called 'integrated regional development' mode, the ambitious targets of the Third Plan 
mirrored the influence of strong forces that continued to view transmigration as a 
population policy aimed at relieving population pressures in Java through the development 
of agricultural settlement in the Outer Islands.
1
 
There is no doubt that the Fourth Plan (1984-1988) reflected the increasing role of 
the transmigration program within the national development policy. The target number to 
be resettled was increased to 750,000 households. The claimed successful outcomes of the 
Third Plan had apparently provided a strong argument for the government to increase the 
                                                 
1
 The central government obsession with promoting population resettlement based on food crop agricultural 
systems as practiced in Java, according to Dove (1985: 32), is essentially a manifestation of the agro-
ecological mythology of the Javanese that has developed on Java and strongly influenced the thinking of 
many policy makers in the central government. 
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target to this level. In the Fourth Plan, foreign financial support to the transmigration 
program, particularly from the World Bank, also increased dramatically. The important role 
of transmigration for national defense and security was emphasized by the Chief of Armed 
Forces, General Benny Moerdani, when he delivered a keynote address at the seminar in 
the National Defense Institute (Lemhanas). According to Moerdani, transmigration policy 
was the only policy within the economic development framework which had a direct 
linkage with national security and defense. He argued that it was necessary for the military 
to be involved in site selection, primarily because transmigration location had a strong 
relation with the concept of territorial management.
2
 
The transmigration policy in the Fifth Plan (1993-1997), indicated a new orientation 
toward more spontaneous transmigration schemes, as well as toward promotion of cash 
crop transmigration settlements. The Fifth Plan set the target of 550,000 families to be 
achieved within five years, of which only 180,000 families would be fully supported by the 
government. The remaining 370,000 families were expected to be assisted through various 
schemes under the spontaneous transmigration program. The Fifth Plan also aimed at 
rehabilitating the poor conditions of existing transmigration settlements. Implementation of 
the Fifth Plan proved to be difficult. Beside the fact that the budget allocated for 
transmigration was obviously limited, another problem also arose as the public image of 
transmigration had been severely affected by the mismanagement in previous periods. The 
data on inter-provincial migration revealed by the 1990 population census clearly indicated 
that many migrants were moved to urban rather than rural areas (Mantra, 1992). It also 
reflected a remarkable shift from sponsored to voluntary migration in the mid-1980s as new 
economic growth centers developed in several urban areas outside Java. 
In 1993, with the commencement of the Sixth Plan (1993-1998), in a clear move to 
boost the involvement of the private sector in the transmigration program, the President 
appointed Siswono Yudohusodo, a successful businessman, to be Minister for 
Transmigration. Although observers generally regarded transmigration as having lost its 
rational justification, President Suharto decided to expand the scope of transmigration to 
include the resettlement of the so-called forest squatters. The department was then renamed, 
                                                 
2
  Kompas, 8 March 1985.  
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the Department of Transmigration and Resettlement of Forest Squatters. The beginning of 
the Sixth Plan also marked the President‟s statement about various groups of people who 
were living below the poverty line. The state‟s rhetoric on raising population groups 
officially considered as below the poverty line conveniently supported the new task of 
transmigration. Forest squatters, including many isolated tribal groups in the outer islands, 
had been officially recognized as among those living below the poverty line, and become a 
new target of the transmigration policy.  
Apart from the sponsored migration, the increasing numbers of voluntary migrants 
to the other islands have apparently resulted in the increase of social tension between 
migrants and local people.  In 1995 conflicts broke out between migrants and local people, 
in East Timor, Papua and Flores, all in Eastern Indonesia provinces. In January 1997 
conflict occurred in Sanggau-Ledo, West Kalimantan, between the Madurese migrants and 
the indigenous Dayak people. Perception on the increasing economic gap between migrants 
and local people are the underlying factors of these ethnic group conflicts (Tirtosudarmo, 
1997). Social tensions also occurred as transmigration also perceived by the locals as the 
way the central government to spread Islam in places like Papua. The communal conflicts, 
often wrongly labeled as ethnic and religious conflicts, between the local population and 
the migrants that occurred in Sampit (Central Kalimantan) Poso (Central Sulawesi) and in 
Ambon and Halmahera (Maluku); following the collapsed of Suharto‟s government in 
1998, often associated with the transmigration program. Transmigration that heavily 
imposed by the central government has easily perceived as the cause of marginalization of 
the local population as the program symbolically represent the oppressive feature of the 
central government to the region. The communal conflicts in Sampit, Poso, Ambon and 
Halmahera, mostly occurred in the urban areas and almost none of Javanese migrants 
involved in the conflict. The violent conflicts have forced many migrants to leave their 
settlements, creating a large number of internally displaced people (IDPs). Figure 5.1. show 
the number of IDPs that occurred between February 200 and December 2003 that 
approaching 1,4 millions people during its peak. Apart from IDPs that caused by communal 
conflicts in Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Maluku; the figure also includes IDPs caused by 
arms conflicts in Aceh, East Timor and Papua. 
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At the end of the Fifth Plan, it was obvious that even though the target had already 
been set very low, its achievement was generally even lower. The implementation of 
transmigration policy drastically declined following the collapse of Suharto government in 
1998. The rising role of the local government, particularly outside Java, significantly 
curtailed transmigration as the program perceived as only benefiting migrants and 
marginalizing local populations. While transmigration program persistently exist in the 
official policy the number of people moved under this program substantially reduced (Table 
2.3). Given the multiple goals and the ideological nature of the program, evaluation result 
on the overall impacts of the program has always controversial and depending on who 
make the assessment. Demographically, however, transmigration program have only 
reduced a small portion of population growth in Java and Bali. While the impact on the 
place of origin is demographically insignificant, for some places in the destination areas, 
transmigration have significantly contributed into the growth of the population, most 
clearly in the southern part of Sumatra, the middle part of Sulawesi, and in the coastal 
regions in Kalimantan. In several destination areas, particularly where the soil is fertile, 
such as in Lampung (Sumatra), and Luwu (Sulawesi), transmigration have significantly 
contributed into the regional economy, particularly through the increase in agriculture 
production. Politically, transmigration program provides a room for the state to impose 
their particular need to be served through the program. Evicting unwanted group of people 
that perceived as the source of problem for the government could channeled through 
transmigration as the case of moving people who resist the construction of dam in Central 
Java in the early 1990s. While the state always argued that the program is voluntary, it is 
difficult to deny, however, that there are some instances that the use of force to move 
people from one place to the other under the program. The transmigration program 
inherently posits a source of social tensions between migrant and non migrant groups, as 
flare ups in destination areas where social relations and local politics is  fragile, such as 






Migration and Regional Development  
 
Titus (1978) show that development strategy  and foreign economic activities play an 
important role in affecting interregional population movement in Indonesia. The most 
favoured of the foreign company investment are the extractive industries, such as: timber 
and oil industries, as well as assembling and construction industries, followed by commerce 
and services. Those kind of activities have attracted a great deal of foreign capital. The 
development of the extractive activities is almost exclusively limited to the islands outside 
Java, other activities mainly in the urban centers on Java. The capital city of Jakarta alone 
has attracted some fifty percent of all foreign invesment excluding the extractive sectors. 
Accrding to Titus, the highest mobility together with net in-migration is to be found in the 
economic boom provinces, of both the center type (Jakarta, North Sumatera) and the 
relatively developed periphery type (South Sumatera, Riau, East Kalimantan). The lowest 
mobility and a zero migration balance is to be found in the isolated and still largely self 
sufficient periphery type of province, i.e. East and West Nusatenggara. The highest 
mobility together with net out-migration appears in the highly integrated but stagnating 
peripheral provinces close to center groups (i.e. West Sumatera, Central Java and 
Jogyakarta).  
The decreased availability of land can theoritically be off-set by investing in 
technology or intensify cultivation. Unfortunately, the modernization of agricultural 
production in some rural areas in Java has created more unemployment. For example in 
rural Java the use of the huller and small tractors has drastically reduced the number of 
farm workers. There has been a shift of labour from agricultural sectors to non agricultural 
sectors, mainly in urban areas, such as in domestic services or petty trade. Montgomery 
(1975) showed that new rice strains did not have any effect on agricultural employment 
because they were only meant to make Java self sufficient in rice.According By 1976 the 
rural urban disparity in income had increased, especially in Java. The urban-rural disparity 
in non-food expenditure is much greater than in food expenditure. Within food items, there 
is very little disparity in expenditure on basic foods, such as cereals and casava. The 
disparity is greater to the 'medium foods, such as fruits and vegetables and tobacco, and 
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highest for the superior food as meat, fish, eggs, and milk. Among non-food items in 1970 
the disparity in housing expenditure was quite low, while it was very high for 
miscellaneous items, which include comsummer durables. In all cases the urban-rural 
disparity was higher in Java than outside Java.  From 1970 to 1976, as a result of the 
government monetary stabilization policy and the concentration of development areas, 
urban incomes have increased much faster, especially in Jakarta and other large cities than 
in rural areas. Such changes would normally have led to migration from rural to urban 
areas. 
There is no doubt that during the Suharto era many improvement have been made in 
almost every aspect of social life in Indonesia. In the first five year development plan 
(1969-1973), the government emphasized the development of infra structure and 
communication, i.e. roads, railroads, harbours, airfields. In the social sectors the growth in 
education was also dramatic. While only about half the children at primary school age was 
enrolled in schools 15 years ago, now many more children at that age have access to 
schooling. Each village with a population of around 2000-3000 people have at least one 
primary school and many have more than two. Health facilities have entered the 50,000 
villages with provision of integrated health service for every sub-diatrict. In the beginning 
of the second half of the 1970s satelite communication was introduced. Later, the 
government distributed television sets in every sub-district. The combination of the increase 
in education, health services and the availability of transportation and communication 
facilities have caused rising hopes and aspirations of rural young people which resulted in 
the movement to urban centers. 
According to the Leknas Migration Survey (Suharso, et al, 1976), more than one 
half of migrants were not married at the time of the survey and since more had married 
between the time of migration and the the time of survey the proportion who were not 
married at the time moving was probably much higher. The majority of the migrants had 
not worked prior to moving, primarily because many were still going to school up the time 
when they moved. Among the female migrants about one third were married before 
moving. The education characteristics of migrants to Jakarta and other province of Java 
show a higher educational level than native born residents in these provinces. The reverse 
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was the case in Sumatera and other islands. This distribution may reflect the fact that the 
more educated, who are also younger persons, have been involved to a considerable extent 
in migration to Java. While the migration to Sumatera and other islands consisted to 
agreater extent of the movement of unskilled workers, presumably  the migrants under state 
sponsored migration programs. The most common occupation for those who were 
employed was farming, but this accounted for only twelve percent of the total migrants. 
Although about seventy five percent of the migrants come from rural areas, most were 
either out of the labor force or employed in non farm work prior to moving (Suharso, et al, 
1976).  
At the village level, Mantra (1981: 151-154) showed that more males than females 
wanted to migrate from the dukuh. Married women in particular, did not want to leave their 
local community especially since their attention was generally focused upon the children, 
close kin and proximate neighbors. The young educated and unmarried people from rural 
and small cities were groups who were pulled by the extension of job opportunities in the 
urban centers. In addition, the decreasing of job availability in agricultural sectors has 
pushed them to seek a job in the cities. The movement of a large group of people from a 
community usually has dramatic effects on the demographic characteristics of those left 
behind.. The movement also influences the social and economic growth of the place of 
origin. According  to Hugo (1987) in his vilage study in West Java, remittances made up 
more than fifty percent of total household income. The bulk of remittances was spent on 
education or invested in housing. The out migration of people from the village, mostly 
young, however also produced social problems. Among the problems related to brain drain, 
suc as difficulties in selecting village leaders, and in raising enough labour for various 
cooperative work projects. The rate of divorce also seemed to be increasing in places from 
where a large number of males has out migrated. 
In the literature, urban destination has received more attention than rural 
destination. Several migration studies in Jakarta, showed that in-migration was very 
important in the growth of Jakarta, not only in items of population growth but also on urban 
development. History  has shown that Jakarta was built by migrants. Undoubtedly the large 
number of migrants led to increasing demand on public facilities, such as housing, 
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transportation and hospitals. Montgomery (1975) showed that Indonesia is experiencing a 
serious urban unemployment problem among the young, althought the evidence was based 
on rough and satisfactory data. Even though there was ahigh risk of not getting job, 
migration to the cities is still taking place. Another impact of large numbers of poor 
migrants in the cities, which has not received much attention from researches is the socio-
political impact on national political stability. Jones (1977: 37) showed that in the case of 
Jakarta and Surabaya a true urban proletariat divorced from any rural roots, is likely to 
develop. The migrant poor will continue to compete for jobs and services with the local-
born poor and also with the urban middle classes. It is possible that this situation can lead 
to social unrest and political conflicts. 
After the decline role of state‟s sponsored migration in the mid 1980s, voluntary 
migration becoming more influential in the development of economy in the region. 
Migration play crucial role in the human resources development (education, health, 
employment) where inequalities continuously persisted as the structural context of 
migration. In this part, special attention will be given to migration in some backward 
regions, such as Papua, as increasing communal tensions apparently occurring as migrants 
tend to be more resourceful then the local population. From the beginning of its five-year 
development plan in 1967, Indonesia gradually sought to integrate its national development 
into the regional and global capitalist economy. The substantial lack of capital was one of 
the reasons for beginning of the open door policy to invite foreign loans and investors into 
the country. Aided by large inflows of conssesional finance and substantial foreign private 
direct investment from Japan, Indonesia in the 1970s actively exploited its considerable 
natural resources, the mainstay of which has been oil. The Indonesian economy performed 
reasonably well during the 1970s; with an average growth rate per capita GDP of 5.4 per 
cent. This was better than its major ASEAN partners, and approaching those achieved in 
the NICs. 
During the 1980s, the global oil surplus led to a decline in foreign exchange 
earnings and a resolve on behalf of government to diversify its export base. Since the early 
1980s, a series of reforms has been introduced which are designed to improve economic 
efficiency and shift the direction of the economy from import-substitution to an export 
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orientation, with a particular emphasis on non-oil exports. Many economic reforms, 
including deregulation, have been introduced to facilitate operations in the financial sector, 
promote foreign trade, encourage investment (particularly foreign investment), streamline 
customs and shipping, ease regulatory controls on land transport, and improve the country's 
tax base. From the available evidence, it seems that these reforms have stimulated foreign 
investment and significantly boosted non-oil exports. By 1995, Indonesia was ranked by 
the World Bank as a middle income country with a per-capita income of close to US$1,000, 




Among economists, however, there have always been different views on the impact 
of economic reforms on the distribution of income. These divergent views are partly due to 
the different approaches and methods used to measure the economic impacts on income 
distribution. Azis, for example, applying the so-called computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model, to the Indonesian case, indicates through both the static and dynamic 
simulations that the post-reform progress in the country‟s macroeconomic condition is 
likely accompanied by worsening--albeit slightly--household income distribution between 
income groups. The non agricultural sector appears to be the major beneficiary of the 
reform. From the dynamic simulations, a worsening distribution is also found between rural 
and urban areas. However, results of both simulations also show that an improved poverty 
condition is likely achieved following the reform.
4
 
Data on recent migration clearly shows that the number of migrants for the period of 
1985-1990 is larger than the previous two periods (1975-1980 and 1980-1985). The 
provinces which have a higher rate of recent migrants increase during the 1985-1990 period 
compared with the two previous periods are Aceh, Riau, Bengkulu, West Java, Central 
Java, East Java, East Timor, Central and East Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, Maluku and 
Papua. In contrast to other parts of the country, the increasing number of recent in-
migration to provinces in the eastern part of Indonesia was already occurring in the 1980-
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 Indonesia is labeled by Hill (1996) as Southeast Asia‟s emerging giant in his recent book which 
comprehensively assesses the Indonesian economic achievements since 1966. 
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As the government capacity to sponsor population movement through 
transmigration program became limited, as oil price collapsed, in mid 1980s, the majority 
of recent migrants in the 1985-1990 periods were most likely to be voluntary migrants. The 
various economic reforms which have been implemented since the mid-1980s to boost 
foreign investment apparently have resulted in the opening up of job opportunities in many 
places, such as Batam Island in Riau, East Kalimantan and Papua. A significant indication 
that the majority of recent in-migration consist of spontaneous or voluntary migrants is 
their destinations, which are mostly urban areas compared to rural areas. The process of 
population mobility change from assisted to voluntary migration was accompanied by the 
process of labor reallocations from low income agriculture to higher productivity non 
agricultural employment.  
According to Vidyattama (2008), internal migration is an important aspect in 
Indonesia‟s provincial economic growth not only because of its magnitude but also because 
it has been government policy in encouraging economic convergence in Indonesia. Based 
on the 2000 census data, Vidyattama (2008: 240-241)  calculated that around 10 percent of 
the Indonesian population was not born in the province where they reside and around 3 
percent resided in different provinces again five years earlier. Utilising Indonesian 
provincial population data from the census of 1980, 1990 and 2000; Vidyattama (2008) is 
able to provide five yearly pattern of population mobility during 1975-2000.
6
 The analysis 
however does not include lifetime migration, which is indicated by the number of people 
who lived in a different province where he or she was born, instead is concentrated on the 
impact of five years migration flows on five years income growth. The lifetime migration, 
according Vidyattama (2008), represents the stock variable and hence indicates the impact 
of a migration network more than the impact of migration flow.  Three aspects were 
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  In Indonesia the only source of information on population mobility or migration at the national level is the 
population census. The population census is taken every ten years and the latest was undertaken in 1990. 
Information on two types of migrants can be derived from the population census. Lifetime migrants are those 
people whose province of birth is different from the current province of residence. Recent migrants are those 
people whose place of residence five years before the census is different from their current province of 
residence. In many ways, the data on recent migrants provides more accurate pictures on existing population 
mobility than the data on lifetime migrants. 
6
 Vidyattama (2008) utilised the Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1991 and 1995) procedure in examining the impact 
of migration on the convergence process and using the Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel estimation to 
examine the impact on provincial growth; those migration pattern than analysed. 
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specifically analysed, namely income, employment and human capital, in relation to the 
interprovincial migration pattern during 1975-2000.
7
 
The migration flow from low income provinces to medium and high income 
provinces was still significant in Indonesia during 1975-1980 and 1985-1990, comprising 
approximately 26 percent of all migration flows. The lower number of migration from 
lower income provinces was mainly because of the low emigration rate from East and West 
Nusa Tenggara although the low number of the population in low income provinces was 
also one of the reasons. Human capital must play a role in determining the low migration 
rate from West and East Nusa Tenggara, since the migration rate from Maluku or Southeast 
Sulawesi (where human capital is higher) was still much higher than for the two Nusa 
Tenggara provinces. However, the number dropped to only 9.3 percent during 1995-2000. 
Thus drop was a result of the large increase in the migration amongst medium income 
provinces partly because of the 1997-2000 crises and conflict. As expected, the opposite 
direction of this flow (i.e., from high and medium income provinces to low income 
provinces) was low at below 15 percent of all migration, except during 1975-1980, when 
the flow from medium to low income provinces alone was 14.9 percent. The transmigration 
program was the main reason for this high flow to low income provinces in that period.  
The correlation between net migration rate and initial unemployment rate shows 
positive signs for the 1980-1985 and 1985-1990 periods, meaning most people migrated to 
unemployment areas in those periods. In 1980-1985, migration to Jakarta dominated this 
positive correlation. In addition, the transmigration program to Central Sulawesi and the 
migrating culture of West Sumatran people also played an important role. In the period 
1985-1990, Jakarta began to have negative net migration, but most of these migrants went 
to surrounding areas in West Java that also had a high unemployment rate (fifth highest in 
Indonesia). Nevertheless, migration to Riau and East Kalimantan seemed more influential 
in producing this positive correlation between migration and unemployment since each of 
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 Information on the impact of migration on human development, such as on income, poverty, education, 
health and community participation, unfortunately is very sketchy. In an attempt of filling this information 
gap, a group of researchers from Australia and Indonesia is currently conducting a survey on rural-urban 
migration in four cities (Tanggerang -West Java, Medan-North Sumatra, Makassar-South sulawesi and 
Samarinda-East Kalimantan), the result of their analysis however still in progress. 
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these provinces had more than 5 percent net migration as well as being in the five highest 
unemployment provinces. The correlation between net migration and the unemployment 
rate during the period 1990-1995 shows a negative sign because, on average, people were 
migrating out of high unemployment areas during that period. Further analysis shows this 
negative correlation was mainly due to increasing negative net migration from Jakarta as 
well as its unemployment rate. Exclusion of Jakarta from the data range produces a positive 
correlation between migration and unemployment. Other than Jakarta, this correlation is 
dominated by big migration flows to East Kalimantan, Riau and West Java.
8
 
The correlation between migration and unemployment was weak during 1995-2000. 
One of the main reasons was the high emigration from Aceh and Maluku due to the conflict 
there. These two provinces had a relatively medium level of unemployment in 1995 and 
people fled mainly for safety reasons rather than seeking income. Another reason was the 
massive increase in migration to Riau at the same time as the rapid industrialisation in that 
province, especially in Batam. So there were increasing job opportunities in Riau that 
moderated unemployment before 1995 and an increasing level of services and 
infrastructure that motivated people to migrate there. As a result, there is no relationship in 
this case between migration and initial unemployment. The correlation between migration 
and unemployment was still insignificant in 2000-2005. This is partly because migration 
outflows from Jakarta, the highest unemployment province, were offset by the fact that the 
flow was still to West Java, the fourth highest. Meanwhile, migration inflows to 
Yogyakarta and Bali where unemployment was low combined with inflows to Riau, East 
Kalimantan, and Papua, where unemployment was high, resulted in no significant 
correlation between migration and unemployment. 
Human capital is another important factor in determining migration‟s impact on 
growth. As discussed, the human capital in Indonesia of both emigrants and immigrants is 
always higher than the average work force human capital (Table 3.6). As a result, migration 
will have a clear positive impact on human capital if the human capital level of immigrants 
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services and infrastructure can explain this mobility toward these areas with better infrastructure, relatively 




is higher than emigrants and the province has positive net migration. In contrast, the impact 
will be negative if the province has negative net migration and in addition, the human 
capital of emigrants is higher than immigrants. Beside these two conditions, it is hard to 
measure whether migration will increase or decrease a province‟s human capital level. 
There were only a few provinces that have a clear positive or negative impact from 
migration on their human capital. West Java was the only province that had higher educated 
immigrants than emigrants for the entire 1980-2000 period, so that migration was highly 
likely to boost human capital. It also had positive net migration during 1980-2000 (Table 
3.5). Jakarta and East Kalimantan were provinces with higher educated immigrants than 
emigrants until 1995, but Jakarta also had negative net migrants after 1985 that may have 
caused human capital depletion. Riau, Bali and Yogyakarta all had positive net migrants 
and higher educated immigrants than emigrants in most of periods especially after 1990.  
Yogyakarta has a special role as one of the centres for education in Indonesia 
besides Jakarta. As a result, Yogyakarta has always had the highest average education for 
both emigrants and immigrants (Table 3.6). However, in contrast to other periods, the level 
of education of emigrants was higher than for immigrants during 1985-1990. This is most 
likely related to the 1986-1992 industrialization period in Indonesia that attracted university 
graduates to other Java provinces especially from Yogyakarta. Riau and Bali had developed 
manufacturing and tourism industries, respectively, from the end of the 1970s, but during 
1980-1985 and 1985-1990, emigrants‟ level of education from these two provinces was still 
higher than for immigrants. In the case of Bali, this was mainly because emigrants‟ level of 
education was relatively high especially during 1985-1990. That industrialization in Bali 
was not as high as their Java neighbours can explain this outflow of educated migrants. 
This was not the case in Riau where the higher level of emigrants compared to immigrants 
was mostly due to the relatively low level of education of immigrants. The fact that Riau 
developed labour intensive palm oil plantations as well as labour intensive manufacturing 
industry can explain this migration inflow. The more developed manufacturing and tourism 
industry is a reasonable explanation for why the education of immigrants was higher than 
that of emigrant in Riau and Bali, respectively since 1990.  On the other hand, human 
capital depletion as a result of migration surely took place in Central Java and West 
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Sumatra where the education of emigrant was higher than immigrants for the entire 1975-
2005 period and there was also net migration outflow at the same time.  
Hugo et al. (1987, quoting in Vidyattama, 2008) argue that a long history of 
population pressure on agricultural resources in Central Java is the main reason for young 
educated labour seeking job opportunities outside the province. They also argue that the 
culture of “merantau”, i.e., seeking jobs or a life away from their village, is the main reason 
for young people in West Sumatra going to other provinces. However, a proportion of these 
migrants tended to return and resettle in their village of origin after their productive age. 
Despite experiencing depletion from migration, the total human capital level of Central 
Java and West Sumatra actually increased by 5.2 and 4.4 years of schooling, respectively, 
during 1975-2005. The potential for labour to successfully migrate and get the job they 
want is higher if they have some education. This can also increase the motivation to 
accumulate human capital. Nevertheless, the national policy to increase education launched 
at the beginning of the 1980s has clearly played a role in the increase of education levels. 
The relationship between migration and human capital accumulation for Indonesia‟s 
provincial case during 1975-2005 was mostly positive. However, the relationship was 
negative during 1980-1985 and 1995-2000. During 1980-1985, the negative relationship 
was mainly affected by Papua owing to a decrease in education level. The transmigration 
program from Java could be the reason for this negative correlation but the lower education 
level in 1985 could also have been the result of better coverage in the survey on remote 
area population. There was no province during 1995-2000 that could be the single reason 
for the negative correlation. Conflict in Maluku and Aceh clearly contributed to this 
negative result but even eliminating these provinces would not make the relationship 
positive.  
The trend and pattern of human movement in the eighties apparently continue in the 
1990s and 2000s (Table 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5). With the substantial reduction in the government 
capacity to move people under transmigration policy, migration significantly constitute a 
function of labor market economy.
9
 In the situation where government only play a little role 
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  The number of families who were moved under the transmigration program in the post-Suharto era (1999-
2007) in total only 130,661 (Table 2.3). 
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in directly influence human mobility, apart from individual networks, labor recruitment 
agencies increasing becoming more influential. Labor recruitment agencies or other kind of 
mediators and brokers, emerging as the major players in the lucrative migration industries 
of overseas contract workers. The surplus of labor in densely populated areas, particularly 
in Java, Bali and Lombok, logically become the source of labors for other places, within 
Indonesia and beyond. Internally, the opening economic opportunities in some places like 
Papua, and the fact that the local population has relatively low human resource endowment, 
constitutes the structural inequalities that creates push and pull factors for people‟s 
movement (Table 3.6, 3.7) Papua should be particularly given serious attention in the future 
concerning the development of human movement in this region. As many research reports 
on the increasing communal tensions as the locals perceived migrants as threatening their 
resourced economy and cultural identity.
10
 In-migration to Papua while in many ways 
reflects the work of labor market forces, the perception that migrants represent the threats 
closely related to the local demands for more political recognition. A comprehensive 
political economy approach, in which freedom of movement will not be jeopardized, is 
needed to resolve this current increasing communal tension in Papua. 
While movement of people from Java to the other islands continue to increase, big 
cities in Java, particularly Jakarta, Semarang, Bandung and Surabaya, also continue in 
attracting migrant from all over the place in Indonesia. The latest World Development 
Report by the World Bank argued the important of the economics of geography and 
emphasizes the empirical evidence of agglomeration as the engine behind economic growth 
in the advanced industrializing countries in Western Europe, Northern America and East 
Asia. In the case of Indonesia‟s economic development, the expanding tendencies in the 
public infrastructure investments mainly in Java, in which the current construction of the 
highways connecting big cities (Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang and Surabaya), certainly will 
accelerate the agglomeration process in Java. Human movement obviously will be attracted 
by such a huge concentration of economic activities in Java. Rural to urban and inter-
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 McGibbon, Rodd,  2004, “Plural Society in Peril: Migration, Economic Change, and the Papua Conflict”. 
Policy Studies 13, East-West Center Washington. International Crisis Group (ICG), 2008, “Indonesia: 
Communal Tensions in Papua”, Asia Report , No, 154, 16 June. 
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islands migration into Java will continue to be the major contributions in the process of 
agglomeration in Java. While high economic growth might be achieved through such 
agglomeration processes, as implicated by The World Bank recent report, such a 
development might also, paradoxically, reflecting a continuation of social and economic 
inequalities between rural and urban areas, and between Java and the other islands. The 
archipelagic form of Indonesian geography, and the plurality of its society, should perhaps 
be reconsidered by the state‟s planners in order to make the process of agglomeration in 




International Migration  
 
As a public issue, cross border movement, mostly for economic reasons, only began to be 
recognized by the authorities in the early 1980s. The human rights violations and the dire 
conditions of migrant workers, particularly in Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, has become the 
news headlines in the mid 1980s and triggered public attention. The press reports revealed 
the overseas labor flows that mostly organized by private labor recruiter agencies, operated 
through the back door of the state authority.
11
 Increasing demand for domestic labors, have 
become the strong factors for overseas labor migration and the rising lucrative migration 
industries. The Indonesian overseas labor migration continues characterized by irregularity, 
minimum legal protection and the low wages. The irregular manners of cross border 
migration constitute the difficulties in obtaining the accurate number of their existence. It is 
estimated that at present there are about four million documented migrant workers from 
Indonesia. ILO recently estimated that the number of undocumented migrants is two to four 
times higher than the documented migrants. Approximately seventy two percent of 
                                                 
11
 For further discussion on the beginning of overseas labor issues, see Tirtosudarmo, Riwanto and Haning 
Romdiati, 1997, “A Needs Assessment Concerning Indonesian Women Migrant Workers to Saudi Arabia: A 
Report for the International Labor Office in Jakarta”, Center for Population and Human Resources Studies, 
Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Jakarta,  November. National Commission for Women, 2003, Indonesian 
Migrant Domestic Workers: Their Vulnerabilities and New Initiative for the Protection of Their Rights. 
Indonesian Country Report to the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights of Migrants.  
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Indonesian migrant workers are women, with almost ninety percent of them employed as 
domestic workers in the Middle East and South-East Asian countries. Most migrant 
workers from Indonesia have low levels of education and work in unskilled or semi-skilled 
occupations. Men mostly work in agriculture, construction or manufacturing while the great 
majority of the women are domestic workers or caregivers. (See Table 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3). 
The state‟s response to migration is basically dominated by the political and 
economic forces of the ruling elites in the country.  To comprehend the Indonesian state‟s 
response to contemporary migration it is therefore necessary to understand how the ruling 
elite within the political and bureaucratic systems perceived the population issues, 
particularly the migration phenomena. In this regard, the legacy of past experiences of the 
state‟s response to migration, both during the colonial and post colonial periods, has been 
crucial in shaping the perception, and in turn the responses, of the current political and 
bureaucratic systems on migration and population issues in general. Reducing 
unemployment which is perceived as one of the sources of domestic social and political 
unrest, and acquiring national revenue, are the twin basic goals of the state‟s overseas 
employment policy.  In the last three years, remittances clearly become the driving force 
behind the government policy to improve overseas labor migration. The remittance that 
transfer through formal channel is estimated around 6 billion USD in 2007, increasing from 
5.65 billion USD in 2006 and 5.37 billion USD in 2005. (Figure 4.1). The World Bank 
study on “The Malaysia-Indonesia Remittance Corridor”, found that the use of formal 
channel was drastically declined by over 30 percent from a high of nearly USD 0.40 billion 
in 2002 to USD 0.26 in 2006 (Hernandez-Coss, 2008: xiv). According to the study, total 
remittance coming into Indonesia from Malaysia alone was around USD 2.7 billion in 
2006. It is estimated that only nine to ten percent of remittances to Malaysia from Malaysia 
flow through formal systems. The improvement of formal and transparent remittance 
systems should be carefully implemented, as suggested by The World Bank. At the end, as 
the study recommended, improvement in regulation should recognized the migrant workers 
needs, and their important contribution to the economy. 
Between November 2007 and July 2008, ILO office in Jakarta conducted a study on 





 The study covers 400 returned migrant workers, in five major sending areas: 
Lampung, West Java, Central Java, East Java and West Nusa Tenggara). For some 
provinces, the remittances sent by migrant workers are their primary source of income, by 
far surpassing the national budget transfers. Remittances are a very important source of 
income at the community level, mostly constituting the main source of income for the 
family. One of the most important factors determining the country of destination is the cost 
of placement. The placement fee differs from country to country. Migrant workers have 
limited financial capacity to pay the placement fees, especially when loans are not available 
to migrant workers. Consequently migrant workers mostly choose the destination countries 
with the lowest placement fees, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia. Malaysia and Saudi Arabia are 
among the countries with the lowest placement fees for migrant workers, which reflect the 
fact that migrant workers‟ salaries are among the lowest in these countries. With the 
majority of migrant workers leaving for Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, the majority of migrant 
workers will receive lowest possible pay as migrant workers. Migrant workers then earn 
less money and have less to send home as remittances. High placement fees and the 
absence of loans directly lead to lower remittances sent to Indonesia. The need for 
financing before departure is high among migrant workers. Most migrant workers come 
from low-income families and financial need is the major reason for their migration. And 
the recruitment process costs a significant amount of money. Most of the survey 
respondents had Malaysia and Saudi Arabia as their country of destination and the majority 
of them paid slightly less than IDR 5,000,000 for the placement fee. 
Also, before migration, migrant workers are frequently among the main 
breadwinners in the family. During the pre-departure period, most migrant workers spend 
months at the training centers. During this period, the worker cannot contribute to the 
family, and the family usually has to borrow to pay for the family‟s daily needs. Migrant 
workers often have to borrow from informal sources who charge high interest rates to cover 
daily needs, further indebting the family beyond the placement costs. Migrant workers thus 
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  The findings of the study by ILO presented in this report, all are based on the power point presentation by 
Lotte Kejser, the head of ILO technical advisor for migrant workers project, at National Stake Holders 
Consultation Meeting on “Securing and Leveraging Migrant Domestic Workers‟ Remittances and Their 
Impact on Economic Development in Indonesia”, Jakarta, 25 November 2008. 
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need loans from financial institutions both for migration-related costs, as well as family 
subsistence prior to departure. Migrant workers often have very limited options regarding 
the financing of their migration. Commercial banks require collateral and a formal financial 
track record in order to approve loans.  Migrant workers‟ families usually cannot fulfill 
these requirements. Instead, informal sources, including relatives, friends and 
moneylenders as well as recruitment agencies are the main sources of loans for migrant 
workers. Both sources often charge high interest rates (about ten percent per month). 
Expensive loans to pay both the placement fee and for the family‟s basic needs during the 
pre-departure and repayment period is a significant financial burden for migrant workers 
and their families. Indonesian migrant workers need access to credit tailored to their needs 
at reasonable interest rates from financial institutions. 
The low level of education of migrant workers and the lack of explanation by 
recruitment agencies makes it difficult for most migrant workers to understand or negotiate 
the financial terms of their contracts. Migrant workers often do not know how much the 
recruitment agency charged them for placement and have very little say on their salary and 
benefits. As a result Indonesian migrant workers frequently are overcharged and underpaid, 
and suffer substantial financial losses during the pre-departure phase and during working 
abroad. Without clear knowledge regarding wages, benefits, placement fees, fee repayment 
scheme, etc., it is difficult for workers to develop a financial plan for themselves. Without 
financial planning, it is difficult for workers to be able to save and remit their earnings. 
Migrant workers need pre-departure financial education that prepares migrant workers to 
better understand their work related contract and be able to save and plan for the utilization 
of their earnings. 
More than fifty percent of migrant domestic workers earned between IDR 1-2 
million per month. Their wages are deducted for 6-12 months for the repayment of the 
placement fee. During this period, the workers generally end up receiving only about ten 
percent of what they actually earn. Migrant domestic workers and their families hope that 
they can start remitting immediately, because the family depends on the remittances.  
However, migrant workers must first pay off the placement fee over 6-12 months through 
salary deductions, before they can start remitting part of their salary. The majority of 
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migrant domestic workers remit through informal channels, such as currency exchange 
agents, shops, cargo services, mobile card top ups, acquaintances, or they will carry the 
money themselves. The reasons why migrant workers prefer informal remittances channels 
are that the employers often restrict migrant workers‟ mobility and hold their ID, so 
migrant workers have difficulties using formal remittances channels, such as commercial 
banks. Another factor is that formal remittances channels may be more expensive, and do 
not have networks reaching down to the community level. 
Migrant workers‟ frequency and amount of remittance depended on how long they 
had been working overseas. Migrant workers who had worked for a longer period of time 
could usually remit a larger amount & more regularly. Only fifteen percent of migrant 
workers were able to remit on a monthly basis, whereas more than half (fifty six percent) 
did not have a fixed schedule for remitting their money, and remitted less frequently. The 
frequency of remittances transfers also depends on migrant workers‟ access to transfer 
channels. In places where they have easy access, migrant workers will remit more 
frequently.. Migrant workers‟ degree of satisfaction with the transfer process depends on 
the cost of transfer and the length of the transfer process. More than half of migrant 
domestic workers (fifty two percent) reported that the transfer process took more than three 
days. Migrant workers‟ remittances depend on what they earn and which expenses they 
have in the destination country. Eighty three percent of Central Java respondents remitted 
IDR 3 million or less. Respondents from West Java, Lampung, East Java and West Nusa 
Tenggara remitted larger amounts but less frequently.  
The migrant workers families (parents and spouse) are usually the decision-makers 
regarding the choice to work abroad and how to use remittances. During deployment 
overseas, the utilization of remittances is usually decided and managed by the parents and 
spouse at home. The remittances usually fund family-household expenditures and 
sometimes a family business.  No distinction is made between the family household assets 
and the migrant workers‟ assets, and usually migrant workers don‟t have independent 
decision-making power over the remittances. Therefore it is absolutely necessary to provide 
financial education, not only to migrant workers, but also to the families of migrant 
workers.  Migrant workers‟ families mainly spent remittance on financing routine family 
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expenditures or basic consumption (sixty five percent). Migrant workers families are highly 
dependent on remittances for their basic needs. This reflects the poor income levels of 
migrant workers and their families. When income levels of migrant workers increase, 
remittances tend to be used for other purposes than for basic consumption. Workers who 
went to destination countries paying higher salaries were able to also use the remittances 
for savings, education and buying assets.  
ILO study found that there is a clear link between income and utilization of 
remittances. If income is low due to migration to lower paying countries (which is often 
due to unaffordable high placement fees to higher paying countries), or income is low due 
to long periods of debt repayment for recruitment fees, remittances will only be used for 
daily needs. After basic consumption, the second most popular use of remittances among 
migrant workers was for buying or improving assets. Seventy nine percent of migrant 
workers used remittances for some type of asset ownership or improvement. House 
ownership or renovation and land ownership are among the most common uses of 
remittances for buying assets. On average (in all surveyed provinces), thirty seven percent 
of the migrant domestic worker families were totally dependent on remittances for their 
family income. The highest dependency on remittances for total family income was in West 
Nusa Tenggara where eighty six percent of the migrant domestic worker‟s families 
depended on remittances for all of their household income, due to lower household income 
levels in West Nusa Tenggara. It is a typical practice among families who run micro 
businesses that the money used for the business is not separated from the family money 
used for daily expenditures. Therefore the percentage of remittances used to finance the 
business is difficult to estimate. Although migrant workers‟ remittances finance the 
business, migrant workers usually do not own the business. Businesses management and 
ownership are usually with the parents or spouses. The income from businesses is utilized 
mainly for the needs of the family.  
Based on the household survey on the impact of remittance in three provinces (East 
Java, West Nusa Tenggara and East Nusa Tenggara), Sukamdi et.al. (2004) show that most 
of the remittances are used for “unproductive” activities, such as consumptions or paying 
the debts.  According to the study, most ex-migrants after spending on subsistence needs 
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such as food, clothing, education and health care, they spent remittances on expensive non-
subsistent items, such as unusually modern houses and expensive consumer goods. 
Sukamdi et.al, however, argued that the term “unproductive” should be carefully 
understood, and located within the rural household economy contexts. The ability to pay off 
debts, for example, actually indicates an improvement of welfare and security feelings 
among the household members. Spending the money for the improvement of the physical 
condition of the house, or for buying the better clothing and food qualities, and even for 
paying education or health care, are activities that indirectly demonstrate human capital 
investment. What is lacking in the study on remittance, so far, is the measurement of social 
costs that migrant workers and their families have to pay in order to support the overseas 
migration. The domination of economic perspective in the study of international migration 
overlooks the social aspects of human movements. 
The placement cost for an overseas migrant worker is very crucial in determining 
the whole process of labor migration in Indonesia. The placement cost, that in paper should 
be free, in practice become the major burden for the migrant worker and constitute the 
irregular structure of the overseas labor system in Indonesia. A study by Institute of Ecosoc 
Rights (2008) estimated the placement fees that should be paid by the migrant workers 
according to the destination countries: (1) Hong Kong, 21 to 26 million IDR (equivalent to 
8 months salaries), (2) Taiwan, 36 million IDR (equivalent to 14 months salaries), (3) Saudi 
Arabia, 1 to 3,5 million IDR (cash), (4) Malaysia (800 thousand to 8 million IDR 
(equivalent to 6 to 8 months salaries), (5) Singapore, 1500 to 2,000 SGD (equivalent to 6 to 
8 months salaries), (6) South Korea, 15 to 20 million IDR (cash). The type of jobs that 
Indonesian migrant workers are employed varied according to the receiving countries. 
Domestic helpers, around 80 percent of total Indonesian migrant workers, are exported to 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and the Middle East. Construction and plantation 
workers mostly employed in Malaysia, while manufacturing laborers are employed in 
South Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia. Japan have a bilateral agreement with Indonesia on the 
so called trainee program, in which Indonesian youth were recruited to work in 
manufacturing industries with the salary below the minimum wage of the Japanese 
laborers. Japan also received the young female to be employed in the entertainment 
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industries. Only recently Indonesia sends female nurse to Japan, Middle East and Europe. A 
bilateral agreement between Indonesia and New Zealand recently created for agriculture 
laborers. 
The overseas labor regulation in 2004 emphasizes the authority on overseas labor 
policy on Minister of Labor and the Indonesian embassy in the receiving countries. The 
labor recruiter agencies operate both in the receiving country and in Indonesia. After the 
labor recruiter agency in the receiving country obtain a job order, namely the letter stating 
the list of labor demand, they have to obtain an approval letter from the Indonesian 
embassy office before sending the job order to their labor recruiter counterpart in Indonesia. 
The Indonesian labor recruiter bring the job order to the ministry of Labor to obtain 
approval letter and the number or the quota of labor that they could recruit in a certain time. 
It should be noted that only Ministry of Labor could authorize the permit for the labor 
recruiter agencies. This authorization process is the beginning of the corrupt practices in the 
long process of overseas labor policy. The second corrupt practices are occurred at the time 
when the labor recruiter agencies submit their request to get the letter of approval and the 
quota of labor that they could recruit. Based on the approval letter and the quota that the 
labor recruiter agencies obtain from the Ministry of Labor, the process of recruitment and 
placement officially begin. In practice however, the various form of labor brokers have 
already operated in the country to recruit prospective laborers from places that known as 
the major source for overseas migrant workers. The labor brokers, that constitute a several 
layer of actors, from village, district, province to Jakarta, operate to serve the national labor 
recruiter agencies in recruiting and processing the migrant according to the formal 
bureaucratic requirements, ranging from personal identification, supporting letter from 
family, approval letter from the village head, the health certificate, and the passport. In this 
stage of documentation processes, falsification and bribing the officials occurred without 
any possible noticed and controlled from the public. 
After potential migrant workers are “collected” they are accommodated in the 
holding center, mostly located in Jakarta, firstly to be trained, and secondly to wait for 
placement abroad. In this stage, a waiting time for the migrant workers to be placed in 
destination country could be unlimited.  In this uncertain circumstance, potential migrant 
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workers have literally imprisoned and treated as merely an economic commodity by the 
labor recruitment agency.  Migrant workers have no power to negotiate and their 
employment prospect lies in the hand of the brokers that operates on behalf of the recruiting 
agency. Extortion, bribing, sexual harassment, forced labor; could happened to the potential 
migrant workers at this waiting stage. The labor recruitment agency and its brokers, while 
having an approval letter and the legitimate number of quota, practically only used such 
letters as the legitimacy to recruits potential migrant workers as much as they can, to be 
traded, often with other agencies, both within Indonesia and in the receiving countries. The 
potential migrant workers, which the majority is female, have no possibility to leave the 
holding center as they will be charged, for room and meals, according to the duration of 
their stay in the holding centers. The labor agencies create indebtness that restrict the 
human right of the potential migrant workers. The migration irregularity and the practice of 
human trafficking could occur along the process of placement that ironically is authorized 
by the state. (See Appendix at the back of this paper, on the chart to schematize the 
systematic processes of structural exploitation experienced by the migrant workers, and the 
necessary steps to improve the situation, in Indonesia)  
In the past, the inward looking character of the migration policy in Indonesia is 
reflected in the political-bureaucratic structure which sets political stability and national 
integration as the national priority. Economic development planning, initiated by the 
economists-technocrats since the beginning of the New Order, apparently has not yet been 
integrated with the issue of foreign employment policy. Several policy attempts have been 
introduced in the last three years to tap the potential revenue from the overseas migrant 
workers. Lack of coordination among state‟s institutions dealing with overseas labor 
migration, particularly between Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Foreign Affairs; for 
instance, have caused a lack of policy coherence and bureaucratic inefficiency that 
contributing irregular migration. In 2004 for example a National Law on Placement and 
Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers. This law is aimed at: bringing about better 
migration management, including improving the qualifications of workers and reducing the 
number of illegal and undocumented workers; establishing institutional mechanisms for the 
placement and protection of migrant workers; conducting advocacy on their behalf; and 
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applying administrative and penal sanctions for breaches of its provisions.  
The Government is also working to enhance support services in destination 
countries, develop a more accessible mechanism for support services, improve data 
collection and improve cooperation among Government agencies. The implementation of 
this national law on overseas labor migration however suffered from serious lack of 
coordination between the different agencies that supposed to be involved, both from the 
government as well from the public sectors, namely the labor recruitment agencies. The 
institution that should enforce the law, like the police and the immigration, operates without 
clear supervision and control. The lack of law enforcement has in turn manifested in the 
bureaucratic inertia and inefficiency and rampant corruption. In an attempt to solve the 
bureaucratic inertia, in 2006 the government created a non departmental institution 
specifically in charge of managing the overseas labor migration, namely National Agency 
for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (Badan Nasional 
Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia – BNP2TKI). The agency is 
mandated to provide direct services, coordinate, and oversee documentation, pre-
deployment information and orientation, deployment and return, information dissemination, 
welfare and protection. After two years since its inception, this national agency however 
has suffered from its internal rift as well as conflicting policy with the Ministry of Labor. 
The internal rift that occurred within this new agency is mainly because while the head of 
this agency is recruited from outside the Ministry of Labor, the majority of the staff is 
recruited from the bureaucracy, mostly from the Ministry of Labor. The domination of 
labor ministry bureaucrats within this agency apparently resulted in the “business as usual” 
approach to the overseas labor policy. Some observers also noted the different agendas in 
exploiting the lucrative overseas labor industry, as the two parties are coming from 
different political groups (The Jakarta Post, 17 March 2008).  
The dualistic leadership in handling the overseas labor, between the Head of 
BNP2TKI, Mr. Jumhur Hidayat and the Ministry of Labor, Mr. Erman Soeparno, seems 
anavoidable, which only resulted in the worsening of coordination within the overseas labor 
policy. The intention to improve the recruitment process and to enhance the migrant 
worker‟s protection is therefore unmet even getting worse. The unclear delineation of 
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authority between the head of BNP2TKI and the Minister of Labor is likely the source of 
conflict. The last clear example of the rivalry is the recent Ministry‟s decision to give the 
regional government an authority in the process of labor recruitment. This decision 
(Ministerial decree no 22, 2008) obviously reduced the role of BNP2TKI in the process of 
labor recruitment (The Jakarta Post, 17 February 2009). The dispute between the Ministry 
of Labor and the Head of BNP2TKI only reflect the incompetent of the state in 
implementing a proper overseas labor policy. The failure of Indonesian government to 
improve the bilateral agreement with Malaysia also an indication that both the Ministry of 
Labor and the BNP2TKI play insignificant role in enhancing protection of Indonesian 
laborers in Malaysia. In fact, the Indonesian delegation in the bilateral meeting with the 
Malaysian government was headed by the president himself with Ministry of Foreign Affair 
as the leading agency, but at the end without any significant result in the improvement of 
the labor agreement. The recent massive deportation Indonesian laborers from Malaysia 
also indicating the weakness of Indonesian position to its close neighboring country. 
The issue of overseas labor migration has become a topic of public concern and 
several non-government organizations took up this case as their cause vis-a’- vis the state 
which formally controls the policy and regulation. While the NGOs obviously take a 
critical stance on behalf of the powerless migrant workers, the other non-state actors 
namely the labor recruiters and suppliers have long been very influential in the business of 
overseas labor. It is these business people who in fact have strongly controlled the 
movement of workers abroad, both as mediator with the state or by unlawfully providing 
assistance to the prospective migrants. The tension that is developing between the actors 
involved in attempts to influence the regulations on overseas migrant workers is changing 
slightly after the collapse of Suharto‟s regime as the state is no longer able to continue 
suppressing the strong demand to provide a legal basis for the protection of the overseas 
migrant workers. Yet, the more fundamental problems currently facing the state and the 
nation to consolidate the disillusioned democracy and to recover the national economy 
would probably hamper any chances of instituting clear policy on overseas migrant workers 
in the near future. With the state being incapable of delivering institutional and legal 
protection for overseas migrant workers, on the one hand, and the likelihood of increasing 
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demand for unskilled overseas migrant labors, on the other hand, will likely increased 
irregular migration and human trafficking.  Looking at the main features of human 
trafficking in Indonesia, it is highly likely that human trafficking is operating within the 
system of overseas labor migration. Human trafficking is perhaps only a new name for an 
old social phenomenon of human movement in Southeast Asia. Human trafficking has 
increased in tandem with the increasing demand for labor while the policy is weak and 
corrupt. As shown in table 5.1 and figure 5.2, from March 2005 to October 2008, there are 
more than three thousands victims of trafficking, where the majority is adult female.  The 
provinces of origin of the traffic persons also reflect the major source of overseas migrant 
workers, such as West Java, Central Java, East Java and East Nusatenggara. The highest 
number of human trafficking originated from West Kalimantan most likely because West 
Kalimantan is the major transit area for human trafficking to Malaysia (Figure 5.4). The 
destination countries where the victims of the human trafficking were transported also 
parallel with the destination of the overseas labor migration, most particularly Malaysia. 
(Figure 5.5.).  
Migrant workers issues, particularly its lack of protection and social insurance, 
increasingly attracted civil society movements to involve. As the coming general election is 
approaching, some political parties also began to use the migrant worker issues in their 
campaign. The significant contribution of remittances to the national revenue, only second 
after the gas and oil, attracts migrant workers as popular issues in the national political 
agenda. The numbers of national and local NGOs advocating the improvement of migrant 
workers rights flourish rapidly in the last five years. In 2003 a migrant workers trade unions 
was established, and now claimed as having more than three thousands ex-overseas migrant 
workers in various places in Indonesia. Currently, the government and the parliament is 
working on the revision of 2004 National Law on Placement and Protection of Indonesian 
Overseas Workers, that is considered by the current government as flaws and therefore 
should be amended. Closed and public meetings are conducted both by the government, 
parliament, migrant workers related NGOs, migrant workers trade union,  labor recruiters 
associations, and civil society organization in general, to voice their opinions in attempt to 
influence the formulation of the new law on migrant workers. 
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While labor migration clearly involved member countries of ASEAN (Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations), where Indonesia and Philippine are the largest labor source 
countries, and Malaysia and Singapore are the major labor destination countries, yet 
regional agreement concerning the protection and migrant rights is absent. Cross border 
labor movement is arrange mainly through bilateral agreement between sending and 
destination countries without any binding instruments that should be the regaling umbrella 
at the regional level. Cross border labor movement apparently is regarded as a sensitive 
issue among the governments in Southeast Asia and there is a tendency to discuss the issue 





Labor Migration and Financial Crises 
 
Indonesia was a country that strongly hit by the contagion effect of regional monetary 
crises in East and Southeast Asia that began in the mid 1997. The crises that start by the fall 
of Thai‟s bath against the US dollar indicate the fragile fundamentals of the country‟s 
financial institutions. The Southeast Asian economy and Indonesia in the last years of 
Suharto regime, proven to be weak and failed to contained the incoming monetary crises. 
As many observers have predicted, the effect of monetary crises would be most severely 
felt in 1998 and 1999, and the affected countries would need at least five years to rebuild 
their economies to pre-crisis level. The report compiled by Asian Migrant Center (AMC) 
that is based in Hong Kong, demonstrate that over 24 million workers from eight countries 
become jobless in 1998, and over 3.5 million of them lost their jobs in the first year of the 
crises (1997). By the end of 1998, it is estimated that at least 900,000 migrant workers were 
dismissed or deported from destination countries, such as Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. 
Among the Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia was the most severaly devastated 
by the crisis. Inflation soared to 61% in 1998 from less than 8% in 1996. The 8% economic 
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growth in 1996 plunged to -14% in 1997, one of the deepest recession ever experienced in 
the region. Per capita GDP was almost halved from US$ 1,155 in 1996 to US$665 by end 
of 1998. The government believes that Indonesia‟s poverty incidence drastically drop from 
11% to 40%, putting almost 80 million below poverty line. This extreme economic 
situation, among others, resulted in panic food-buying and numerous riots and looting in 
various parts of Indonesia in 1998. An in-depth socio-economic study by Breman and 
Wiradi (2002) in two villages in the north coast of West Java, show deep impact of the 
crisis in the daily livelihood and the economic strategy adopted the people in the village. 
The belief that economic growth has brought prosperity to the poor in Java, according to 
this study, proven to be a myth, as the 1997 financial crises push back the urban poor to 
return to their rural community in the villages with most often only limited savings. The 
few job opportunities in the villages that seasonally forced them out to seek jobs in the 
informal sectors in the cities, now becoming more contested as the village economy 
constituted the safety net for these return migrants. These seasonal or circular migrants, 
according to Breman and Wiradi (2003) most likely were unrecorded by the statistic office 
and perceived by the authority as rural dwellers.  
The two villages have also involved in the business of international migration, 
particularly for the women as domestic workers in Saudi Arabia. In 1998 the two villages 
have 58 females as migrant workers abroad. Although the formal requirements, such as 18 
years as the minimum age, if marriage have no children below 12 months. These formal 
requirement in practice, however easily avoided. The study also reported former sex 
workers also working as domestic workers abroad. In the aftermath of crisis, the study 
reported the increasing pressure for the female to take jobs as domestic helpers abroad to 
substitute their husbands or father who were push back from the city. Despite the facts that 
destination countries, such as Malaysia have also suffered from the financial crisis and laid 
off and deported foreign migrant workers, working abroad still very attractive for the 
female in the village, particularly to Middle East, Breman and Wiradi found that 
remittances constitutes the major economic source for the people in the two village studies. 
The study shows how the brokers have entered into the village to recruits the female to send 
to Middle East for domestic workers. In one village interestingly, the village head even 
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have become the brokers that work for the labor recruitment agency in the city. 
While the financial crisis in 1997-1998 only affected mainly East and Southeast 
Asian countries, the recent crisis affected all countries. The crisis that began in the United 
States of America in October 2008 rapidly affected other countries as the US constitutes the 
largest economy in the world. The crisis reflects a global economic downturn that resulted 
in the reduction of economic activity and production. The crisis mostly affected 
manufacturing industries. Indonesian migrant workers that mostly suffered from the 
financial crisis are from South Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia. A government source 
estimated that at least 600,000 overseas migrant workers will lose their jobs abroad by July 
2009. Until February 2009 it was reported that 27,587 migrant workers have been laid off 
from their job in several destination countries, some of them have returned home. The 
return of overseas migrant workers as caused by the financial global crisis will contribute to 





In this report, human movement is perceived as an individual choice in response to 
structural changes in the society. Apart from the tradition, people also move as a result of 
the state‟s intervention. It can be argued that migration in Indonesia has always been the 
outcomes of a combination of factors: mobility traditions, market economy and state 
interventions. Human movement is part of the people‟s culture in the Indonesian 
archipelago and in Southeast Asia in general. Ethnic migration is common among the 
mobile ethnic groups, such as the Madurese, Bugis, Makasarese, Baweanese, Banjarese as 
well as the Javanese. The arriving of foreign traders, such as the Chinese and the 
Europeans, further expand the human mobility in the region. Under the European 
colonialism movement of people intensified and new forms of human movement 
introduced, particularly the state‟s sponsored migration as well as the movement of contract 
workers. The development of port cities and urban areas also introduced rural-urban type of 
migration, which continues until today. 
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The state, both the colonial and after independent, have always interested to use 
migration as a devices to control the economy and politics. The colonial government views 
that migration is part of the capitalist economy, particularly as cheap labors that can be 
relocated to support plantation and extractive industries.  The post-colonial governments, 
especially during the New Order, not only perceive the movement of people as important 
factor to develop the regions outside Java, but more importantly as critical factor in the 
process of national integration. Human movement however will never be confined within 
the state control policy. Individual and social networks that are embedded in the economy 
and culture will continue to provide human agencies to improve their human welfare 
conditions. The process of interaction between migrant and local population often create 
tensions and conflicts. The shift from social tensions into violent conflicts occurred when 
the perceived inequality overlap with the different communal identities between migrant 
and local populations. The heated local politics, as currently exist in Papua for example 
constitutes the structural contexts that strongly contribute the shift from tensions into open 
conflicts. 
The increasing labor movement across the state borders, while in many instances 
facilitated by the labor recruitment agencies or in the worst situation organized by human 
traffickers, ironically reflects the state incapacity to properly manage the economics of 
human migration. Human trafficking apparently embedded within the system of labor 
recruitment and placement of overseas labor. The high demand for female domestic helpers 
abroad contribute the burgeoning practice of false recruitment and human trafficking. The 
state clearly plagued by the inability to install a coherent overseas labor policy that assured 
security protection and improving welfare for the migrants. While the state should improve 
the current overseas migration policy, it should not loose sight that such a policy is only a 
partial solution to the domestic economic problem that needs a long-term and viable 
national development strategy. The lack of coherent overseas labor policy resulted from the 
state incompetent in minimizing the corrupt bureaucracy and the vested interests, certainly 
cannot be isolated from the wider problem of lack of democratic accountability in 
Indonesia. 
International labor movement increased, on the one hand as caused by continue 
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state failure to provide jobs for its growing labor force, and on the other hand as the strong 
demand for labor seemingly unrestrained abroad. Apart from various institutional and 
structural constraints, both internal and international, serious threats also stemmed from 
migrant vulnerabilities from regional and global financial crises.  Movement of people, 
voluntary or involuntary, internal or cross the state border, reflect both individual and social 
endeavors to expand human capacities and people‟s choices. Putting human development as 
the priority agenda within the migration policy could widen the people‟s choice and prosper 
the society. Human development embedded within movement of people in unending 
processes of social change and political transformation. As a nation in the making, human 
movement constitutes an important element in the process of social formation and 
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LOCATION OF BARRIERS AND PROBLEMS MIGRATION STAGES AND POINTS OF VULNERABILITY 
 
NECESSARY STEPS RELATED TO INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL 
DIMENSIONS: 
 CIVIL SOCIETY: Allowing Civil Society Organization to Take a Part in Policy Making 
 SUBNATIONAL LEGAL AND POLICY INITIATIVES: Ensuring Sub national 
Regulation to Protect and Empower Migrant Workers 
 MULTIRATERAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS: Ratifying Relevant and 
Necessary International Labor Convention  
 REGIONAL AGREEMENT: Initiating Regional Agreement on Cross Border Labor 
Cooperation and the Implementation of Labor Rights along the Line with the International Labor 
Convention 
 BILATERAL AGREEMENT: Revising or  Initiating Bilateral Agreement to Ensure the 
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 Profit from Insurance Flows to Private 
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 Too Vague 
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 Migrant Workers Not Understand the Contract 
 Migrant Workers Unable to Enforce to the 
Employer 
 No Formal System to Take Legal 
Action for Migrant Workers 
 Debt 
 Wage Reduction 
 Credit 
 Family Problems Caused by Lengthy 
Separation 
 Just for Consumption (Food, Goods, Housing) 
 Paying the Debt 
 Education Expenses 
 Small Business Investment 
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Part I :   Tables/Figures  
Table 1.1.  Indonesia: Human Development Index (HDI) 1999-2005 
Province Live Expectancy Literacy Rate 
Mean Years of 
Schooling 
Adjusted per capita real 
expenditure 
HDI Rank Shortfall Reduction 





11. Nangroe Aceh Darussalam 67.6 67.7 67.9 68.0 93.1 95.8 95.7 96.0 7.2 7.8 8.4 8.4 562.8 557.5 585.8 588.9 65.3 66.0 68.7 69.0 12 15 18 18 1.3 1.0 
12. Sumatera Utara 67.1 67.3 68.2 68.7 95.8 96.1 96.6 97.0 8.0 8.4 8.4 8.5 568.7 589.2 616.0 618.0 66.6 68.8 71.4 72.0 8 7 7 8 1.9 2.1 
13. Sumatera Barat 65.5 66.1 67.6 68.2 94.7 95.1 95.7 96.0 7.4 8.0 7.9 8.0 577.3 589.0 615.7 618.2 65.8 67.5 70.5 71.2 9 8 9 9 1.7 2.3 
14. Riau 67.8 68.1 69.8 70.7 95.5 96.5 96.4 97.8 7.3 8.3 8.2 8.4 579.6 588.3 616.6 623.2 67.3 69.1 72.2 73.6 4 5 5 3 1.8 5.2 
15. Jambi 66.6 66.9 67.6 68.1 93.7 94.7 95.8 96.0 6.8 7.4 7.4 7.5 574.3 585.6 615.1 620.8 65.4 67.1 70.1 71.0 11 10 10 11 1.7 2.9 
16. Sumatera Selatan 65.5 65.7 67.7 68.3 93.4 94.1 95.7 95.9 6.6 7.1 7.4 7.5 564.5 582.9 608.4 610.3 63.9 66.0 69.6 70.2 16 16 13 13 1.8 2.1 
17. Bengkulu 65.2 65.4 67.4 68.8 92.7 93.0 94.2 94.7 7.0 7.6 7.8 8.0 576.6 586.6 615.5 617.1 64.8 66.2 69.9 71.1 13 14 11 10 1.6 3.8 
18. Lampung 65.9 66.1 67.6 68.0 91.8 93.0 93.1 93.5 6.4 6.9 7.0 7.2 567.0 583.3 604.8 605.1 63.0 65.8 68.4 68.8 18 18 19 19 2.0 1.5 
19. Bangka Belitung   65.6 67.2 68.1  91.7 93.5 95.4  6.6 6.5 6.6  588.2 627.2 628.0  65.4 69.6 70.7  20 12 12  3.5 
20. Kepulauan Riau   68.8 69.5   94.7 96.0   8.0 8.1   613.0 621.9   70.8 72.2   8 7  4.8 
31. DKI Jakarta 71.1 72.3 72.4 72.5 97.8 98.2 98.3 98.3 9.7 10.4 10.4 10.6 593.4 616.9 618.1 619.5 72.5 75.6 75.8 76.1 1 1 1 1 2.2 1.3 
32. Jawa Barat 64.3 64.5 66.7 67.2 92.1 93.1 94.0 94.6 6.8 7.2 7.2 7.4 584.2 592.0 616.1 619.7 64.6 65.8 69.1 69.9 15 17 14 14 1.5 2.6 
33. Jawa Tengah 68.3 68.9 69.7 70.6 84.8 85.7 86.7 87.4 6.0 6.5 6.5 6.6 583.8 594.2 618.7 621.4 64.6 66.3 68.9 69.8 14 13 17 16 1.7 2.9 
34. D. I. Yogyakarta 70.9 72.4 72.6 72.9 85.5 85.9 85.8 86.7 7.9 8.1 8.2 8.4 597.8 611.3 636.7 638.0 68.7 70.8 72.9 73.5 2 3 3 4 1.9 2.2 
35. Jawa Timur 65.5 66.0 67.2 68.5 81.3 83.2 84.5 85.8 5.9 6.5 6.6 6.8 579.0 593.8 616.6 622.2 61.8 64.1 66.8 68.4 22 25 23 22 1.8 4.7 
36. Banten  62.4 63.3 64.0  93.8 94.0 95.6  7.9 7.9 8.0  608.7 618.0 619.2  66.6 67.9 68.8  11 20 20  2.8 
51. Bali 69.5 70.0 70.2 70.4 82.7 84.2 85.5 86.2 6.8 7.6 7.3 7.4 578.9 596.3 614.8 618.2 65.7 67.5 69.1 69.8 10 9 15 15 1.7 2.1 
52. Nusa Tenggara Barat 57.8 59.3 59.4 60.5 72.8 77.8 78.3 78.8 5.2 5.8 6.4 6.6 565.9 583.1 611.0 623.2 54.2 57.8 60.6 62.4 26 30 33 32 2.0 4.6 
53. Nusa Tenggara Timur 63.6 63.8 64.4 64.9 81.2 84.1 85.2 85.6 5.7 6.0 6.2 6.3 576.9 563.1 585.1 589.8 60.4 60.3 62.7 63.6 24 28 31 31 -0.7 2.3 
61. Kalimantan Barat 64.1 64.4 64.8 65.2 83.2 86.9 88.2 89.0 5.6 6.3 6.4 6.6 571.2 580.4 606.7 609.6 60.6 62.9 65.4 66.2 23 27 27 28 1.8 2.3 
62. Kalimantan Tengah 69.2 69.4 69.8 70.7 94.8 96.4 96.2 97.5 7.1 7.6 7.8 7.9 565.4 585.8 615.5 623.6 66.7 69.1 71.7 73.2 7 6 6 5 1.9 5.3 
63. Kalimantan Selatan 61.0 61.3 61.6 62.1 92.8 93.3 94.8 95.3 6.6 7.0 7.2 7.3 576.7 596.2 619.8 622.7 62.2 64.3 66.7 67.4 21 23 24 26 1.8 2.1 
64. Kalimantan Timur 69.0 69.4 69.7 70.3 93.5 95.2 95.0 95.3 7.8 8.5 8.5 8.7 578.1 591.6 620.2 621.4 67.8 70.0 72.2 72.9 3 4 4 6 1.9 2.5 
71. Sulawesi Utara 68.1 70.9 71.0 71.7 97.2 98.8 99.1 99.3 7.6 8.6 8.6 8.8 578.3 587.9 611.9 616.1 67.1 71.3 73.4 74.2 6 2 2 2 2.3 3.1 
72. Sulawesi Tengah 62.7 63.3 64.6 65.4 92.6 93.3 94.4 94.9 7.0 7.3 7.5 7.6 569.0 580.2 604.4 610.3 62.8 64.4 67.3 68.5 20 22 22 21 1.6 3.5 
73. Sulawesi Selatan 68.3 68.6 68.7 68.7 83.2 83.5 84.5 84.6 6.5 6.8 6.8 7.0 571.0 586.7 615.2 616.8 63.6 65.3 67.8 68.1 17 21 21 23 1.7 0.9 
74. Sulawesi Tenggara 65.0 65.1 66.0 66.8 87.1 88.2 90.7 91.3 6.8 7.3 7.5 7.6 571.8 577.9 596.1 598.9 62.9 64.1 66.7 67.5 19 26 25 24 1.5 2.5 
75. Gorontalo  64.2 64.5 65.0  95.2 94.7 95.0  6.5 6.8 6.8  573.3 585.9 607.8  64.1 65.4 67.5  24 28 25  6.0 
76. Sulawesi Barat   66.3 66.4   82.9 83.4   5.9 6.0   602.2 616.3   64.4 65.7   29 29  3.8 
81. Maluku 67.4 65.5 66.2 66.2 95.8 96.3 97.8 98.0 7.6 8.0 8.4 8.5 576.9 576.3 596.1 597.3 67.2 66.5 69.0 69.2 5 12 16 17 -1.3 0.7 
82. Maluku Utara  63.0 63.3 64.2  95.8 95.2 95.2  8.4 8.5 8.5  583.4 588.9 590.3  65.8 66.4 67.0  19 26 27  1.8 
91 Papua Barat   66.8 66.9   85.1 85.4   7.1 7.2   571.5 584.0   63.7 64.8   30 30  3.2 
94. Papua 64.5 65.2 65.8 67.3 71.2 74.4 74.2 74.9 5.6 6.0 6.1 6.2 579.9 578.2 583.8 585.2 58.8 60.1 60.9 62.1 25 29 32 33 1.5 3.0 
 Indonesia
1)
 66.2 66.2 67.6 68.1 88.4 89.5 90.4 90.9 6.7 7.1 7.2 7.3 578.8 591.2 614.1 619.9 64.3 65.8 68.7 69.6     1.6 2.8 
 
Note : For the year 2002, the data of NAD, Maluku, Maluku Utara and Papua using the 2003 data  
1) Indonesian figures is weighted average from provinces figures with population as the weight .  SOURCE: http://www.bps.go.id/sector/ipm/table1.shtml 
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Table 1.2.  Indonesia: Ethnic Group Composition, 1930 and 2000 
 
1930  2000 
  BPS Official Publication* Authors Recalculation** 
No.  Number Percentage  No.  Number Percentage No.  Number Percentage 
1 Javanese    27,808,623  47.02  1 Javanese      83,752,853  41.65 1 Japanese      83,865,724  41.71 
2 Sundanese      8,594,834  14.53  2 Sundanese      30,978,404  15.41 2 Sundanese      30,978,404  15.41 
3 Madurese      4,305,862  7.28  3 Madurese         6,771,727  3.37 3 Malay        6,946,040  3.45 
4 Minangkabau      1,988,648  3.36  4 Minangkabau         5,475,145  2.72 4 Madurese        6,771,727  3.37 
5 Buginese      1,533,035  2.59  5 Betawi         5,041,688  2.51 5 Batak        6,076,440  3.02 
 Chinese      1,233,000  2.03  6 Buginese         5,010,423  2.49 6 Minangkabau        5,475,145  2.72 
6 Batak      1,207,514  2.04  7 Bantenese         4,113,162  2.05 7 Betawi        5,041,688  2.51 
7 Balinese      1,111,659  1.88  8 Banjanese         3,496,273  1.74 8 Buginese        5,010,421  2.49 
8 Betawi         980,863  1.66  9 Others      56,452,563  28.07 9 Bantenese        4,113,162  2.05 
9 Malay         953,397  1.61      10 Banjarese        3,496,273  1.74 
10 Banjarese         898,884  1.52      11 Balinese        3,027,525  1.51 
11 Acehnese         831,321  1.41      12 Sasak        2,611,059  1.30 
12 Palembang         770,917  1.30      13 Makassarese        1,982,187  0.99 
13 Sasak         659,477  1.12      14 Cirebon        1,890,102  0.94 
14 Dayak         651,391  1.10      15 Chinese        1,738,936  0.86 
15 Makassarese         642,720  1.09      16 Gorontlo/Hulandaloa            974,175  0.48 
16 Toraja         557,590  0.94      17 Acehnese            871,944  0.43 
17 Others      5,641,332  9.54      18 Toraja            750,828  0.37 
         19 Others      29,857,346  14.66 
 Total 59138067 100.00   Total    201,092,238  100.00  Total    201,092,238  100.00 
*  Eigth largest ethnic groups as listed in the census volume on Indonesia as a whole (Badan Pusat Statistik 2001a) 
** Compiled and calculated from the 30 publications on the provinces (badan Pusat Statistik 2001b-2001ac) 
*** In the 1930 census, the ethnic Chinese, regardless of their “nationalities”, were classified as “foreign oriental”, and they were calculated separately from the “indigenous population”. The 
number of ethnic Chinese was 1,233,000, constituting 2.03% of the total population in colonial Indonesia (see Centraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek, 1934). When calculating the percentages of 
each “indigenous” ethnic group, however, the total number of the total number of the Indonesian population used was that of the “indigenous population”, hence the Batak formed 2.04% of the 
Indonesian population although its number was only 1,207,514, i.e., fewer than that of the etnic Chinese. 
*** We have been able to reduce the percentage of “others” to 6.95% (see Table 1.2.1). 
 
SOURCE: Suryadinata et.al. (2003: 12) 
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SOURCE :  Suryadinata et.al. (2003: 13).
 4 
Table 1.3.  Indonesia:  Number, Percentage, and the Growth Rate of Religious Followers, 1971 and 2000 
 
Region Follower 
1971 2000 Annual Growth 
Rate % Number % Number % 
Muslims  103,579,496            87.51    177,528,772       88.22                  1.86  
Christians     8,741,706              7.39      17,954,977         8.92                  2.48  
Hindus     2,296,299              1.94        3,651,939         1.81                  1.60  
Buddists     1,092,314              0.92        1,694,682         0.84                  1.51  
Confucians        972,133              0.82             -     
Others     1,685,902              1.42           411,629         0.20                 (4.86) 
TOTAL  118,367,850          100.00    201,241,999      100.00    
Source: Compiled and calculated from Biro Pusat Statistik (1975) and Badan Pusat Statistik (2001a) 
SOURCE:: Suryadinata et.al. (2003: 104). 
 
 




Figure 1.3. Indonesia: Religion Composition,  2000 
 
 
SOURCE:  Suryadinata et.al. (2003: 105). 
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Number Distribution Concentration 
1 Central Java        30,917,006     30,287,197  36.16 97.96 
2 Yogyakarta           3,119,397        3,020,157  3.61 96.82 
3 East Java        34,756,400     27,232,103  32.51 78.35 
4 Lampung           6,646,890        4,113,731  4.91 61.89 
5 Jakarta           8,324,707        2,927,340  3.50 35.16 
6 North Sumatra        11,506,577        3,753,947  4.48 32.62 
7 East Kalimantan           2,441,533           721,351  0.86 29.55 
8 Jambi           2,405,378           664,931  0.79 27.64 
9 South Sumatra           6,856,258        1,851,589  2.21 27.01 
10 Riau           4,750,068        1,190,015  1.42 25.05 
11 Bengkulu           1,561,852           348,505  0.42 22.31 
12 Central Kalimantan           1,800,713           325,160  0.39 18.06 
13 Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam           1,732,627           274,926  0.33 15.87 
14 South Kalimantan           2,975,440           391,030  0.47 13.14 
15 Papua           1,695,932           211,663  0.25 12.48 
16 Banten           8,079,938           986,146  1.18 12.20 
17 West Java        35,668,374        3,939,465  4.70 11.04 
18 West Kalimantan           3,732,419           341,173  0.41 9.14 
19 Central Sulawesi           2,011,298           166,013  0.20 8.25 
20 Southeast Sulawesi           1,776,278           124,686  0.15 7.02 
21 Bali           3,145,368           214,598  0.26 6.82 
22 Bangka Belitung              898,889             52,314  0.06 5.82 
23 Maluku           1,148,294             53,552  0.06 4.66 
24 West Sumatera           4,241,256           176,023  0.21 4.15 
25 North Maluku              668,837             21,211  0.03 3.17 
26 South Sulawesi           7,794,923           212,273  0.25 2.72 
27 Gorontalo              829,948             20,427  0.02 2.46 
28 North Sulawesi           1,972,738             44,192  0.05 2.24 
29 Wet Nusa Tenggara           3,829,905             56,340  0.07 1.47 
30 East Nusa Tenggara           3,802,995             30,795  0.04 0.81 
  TOTAL      201,092,238     83,752,853  100.00 41.65 
Note: The population is limited to Indonesia citizen. The Number of Javanese living in Indonesia with foreign 
citizenship is highly likely to be in signification. 
Source: Compiled and calculated from Tables 09.3, 09.6 and 09.9 in Population of Indonesia, Results of the 2000 
Population Census (Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2001a) 
 
SOURCE:: Suryadinata et.al. (2003: 34) 
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SOURCE:  Suryadinata et.al (2003: 35)
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Part II :   Tables/Figures 
 















Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Jakarta 750 2 2405 4 4412 1 2937 1 6343 3 5171 2 
West Java 4941 13 7230 13 60003 16 37196 16 36997 15 23846 10 
Central Java 10966 29 20148 37 96099 26 45851 20 40754 16 24707 11 
Yogyakarta 5260 13 5150 9 19998 5 8950 19 10352 4 5761 3 
East Java 12044 31 15390 28 93314 25 44512 60 37783 15 24451 11 
Java (subtotals) 33961 88 50323 91 273826 75 139446 2 132229 53 83936 37 
Bali 5100 13 3060 6 14735 4 4369 2 6673 3 4362 2 
NTB (W. Nusatenggara) 300 1 1700 3 12718 3 4236 1 8292 3 7045 3 
NTT (E. Nusatenggara)       3300  3864 2 3561 1 
Lampung       787      
APPDT 75    22284 6 43531 19 95942 39 53567 23 
Resettlement     42414 12 26896 12   76513 34 
Relocation       5857 3     
General Tranmigrants 39436 100 55083 100 365977 100 228422 100 247000 100 228984 100 
Unassisted/Party Ass't 
Transmigrants     7281   169497   521728           
Total 39436   62364   535474   750150   247000   228984   
Note: Due to rounding the totals may not add up exactly. 
Source: Presidential Address, 16 August 1985 (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1985: XII/48-50); Presidential Address, 16 August 1989 (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1989: 
XII/692-5); Presidential Address, August 1993 (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1993: XII/18-18); Presidential Address, 16 August 1997 (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1997: 
XIII/34-37). 
SOURCE: Tirtosudarmo (2001: 211) 
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Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Aceh   800 1 10771 3 7084 3 9312 4 9507 4 
N. Sumatra 200  500 1 8006 2 3651 2 4828 2 6063 3 
W. Sumatera 450 1 3950 7 7603 2 9185 4 6952 3 5737 3 
Riau 500 1 662 1 37522 10 27300 12 39074 16 26994 12 
Jambi 2450 6 10362 19 16682 5 19737 9 16529 7 14748 6 
S. Sumatera 6254 16 6598 12 91340 25 24446 11 24832 10 14965 7 
Bengkulu 1300 3 3600 7 12187 3 9076 4 12591 5 9535 4 
Lampung 11397 29 4500 8 42876 12 17893 9 12515 5 8412 4 
Sumatra (subtotals) 22551 56 30972 56 227047 62 119372 54 112633 52 95961 43 
W. Kalimantan 952 2 2100 4 15141 4 19684 9 24143 10 24945 11 
C. Kalimantan 1253 3 700 1 28221 8 17907 8 12880 5 17117 7 
S. Kalimantan 1490 4 4300 8 15374 4 13922 7 7744 3 8985 4 
E. Kalimantan 1775 5 3311 6 11878 3 15179 7 16525 7 14054 6 
Kalimantan (subtotals) 5470 14 10411 19 70614 19 66692 30 61292 25 65101 28 
N. Sulawesi 1060 3 950 2 4154 1 2811 1 1312 1 1016  
C. Sulawesi 3452 9 5700 10 15740 4 10441 5 13293 5 11404 5 
S. Sulawesi 4441 11 3300 6 3607 1 5325 2 10262 4 6713 3 
E. Sulawesi 2012 5 3250 6 19225 5 7002 3 5412 2 2786 1 
Sulawesi (subtotals) 10965 28 13200 24 42726 11 25579 11 30279 12 21919 9 
Maluku 350 1 200  7635 2 3270 1 5789 2 13450 6 
Irian Jaya 100  300  16616 5 12598 6 18373 7 23991 10 
NTB (W. Nusatenggara)     1289  977  2254 1 2047 1 
NTT (E. Nusatenggara)         830  1915 1 
East Timor     50  934  1550 1 4600 2 
Eastern Indonesia Provinces (subtotals)             28796   46003 20 
Totals 39436 100 55083 100 365977 100 228422 100 233000 100 228984 100 
Note: Due to rounding the totals may not add up exactly. 
Source: Presidential Address, 16 August 1985 (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1985: XII/49); Presidential Address, 16 August 1989 (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1989: 
XII/693); Presidential Address, August 1993 (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1993: XII/17-18); Presidential Address, 16 August 1997 (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1997: 
XIII/34-37).  SOURCE: Tirtosudarmo (2001: 212) 
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Table 2.3. Indonesia: Number of Transmigrants,  1999/ - 2007 (Post-Suharto Period)  
 
No. Year No of Families 
1. 1999 24.383 
2. 2000 6.756 
3. 2001 22.609 
4. 2002 23.907 
5. 2003 19.678 
6. 2004 4.090 
7. 2005 4.590 
8. 2006 14.398 
9. 2007 10.250 
 Total 130.661 
Source: R&D, Ministry of Transmigration, 2006 
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Part III :   Tables/Figures  
 
Table 3.1. Indonesia: Population Distribution and Growth (1971-2000) by Province 
Source: Population census 1971, 1980, 1990, 2000. 
Note: Number in first and second column set as a comparison to Indonesia level = 100. 





Population (% of 
total) Population growth (%) 









Aceh 1.7 2.0 2.4 2.9 2.7 1.6 
North Sumatra  5.5 5.6 1.9 2.6 2.1 1.2 
West Sumatra  2.3 2.1 1.5 2.2 1.6 0.6 
Riau 1.4 2.3 3.7 3.1 4.2 3.8 
Jambi 0.8 1.2 3.1 4.1 3.4 1.8 
South Sumatra  2.9 3.8 2.8 3.4 3.1 2.1 
Bengkulu 0.4 0.8 3.9 4.5 4.4 2.9 
Lampung 2.3 3.3 3.1 5.9 2.7 1.0 
       
Jakarta  3.8 4.1 2.1 4.0 2.4 0.1 
West Java  18.2 21.5 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.2 
Central Java  18.3 15.2 1.2 1.7 1.2 0.8 
Yogyakarta  2.1 1.5 0.8 1.1 0.6 0.7 
East Java  21.4 17.0 1.1 1.5 1.1 0.7 
Bali  1.8 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.2 1.3 
       
West Nusa Tenggara 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.4 2.1 1.3 
East Nusa Tenggara 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.5 
West Kalimantan  1.7 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.6 1.5 
Central Kalimantan  0.6 0.9 3.3 3.5 3.9 2.6 
South Kalimantan  1.4 1.5 2.0 2.2 2.3 1.4 
East Kalimantan  0.6 1.2 4.2 5.8 4.4 2.7 
       
North Sulawesi  1.4 1.4 1.7 2.3 1.6 1.2 
Central Sulawesi  0.8 1.0 2.8 3.9 2.8 1.7 
South Sulawesi  4.3 3.8 1.4 1.8 1.4 1.1 
Southeast Sulawesi 0.6 0.9 3.2 3.1 3.7 2.8 
       
Maluku 0.9 0.9 1.8 2.9 2.8 -0.2 
Papua 0.8 1.0 2.9 2.7 3.3 2.6 
Indonesia 100 100 1.9 2.4 2.0 1.3 





Table 3.2. Recent Inter-Provincial In- and Out-Migrants:  Indonesia, 1975 - 2005 (in thousands)  
 



















51.2  56.3  15.4  na  28.2  49.4  161.6  na  
North Sumatera  95.6  107.9  139.9  107.3  177.3  277.6  358.5  201.9  
West Sumatera  93.1  129.0  109.0  108.3  153.2  173.2  233.9  128.8  
Riau  98.7  245.5  526.7  213.9  53.8  92.9  91.3  98.8  
Jambi  107.3  136.4  109.5  66.3  36.2  64.0  83.3  51.4  
South Sumatera  221.2  212.2  163.3  66.0  132.0  198.8  152.0  106.8  
Bangka Belitung  -  -  36.5  19.9  -  -  33.8  17.8  
Bengkulu  66.9  82.8  68.8  32.7  15.9  28.6  35.8  30.0  
Lampung  507.8  212.3  149.0  91.9  45.6  135.9  149.3  110.9  
Riau Archipelago  -  -  -  154.3  -  -  -  8.6  
Jakarta  766.4  833.0  702.2  575.2  382.3  993.4  850.3  734.6  
West Java  552.0  1,350.6  1,097.0  730.9  468.4  495.7  631.8  443.0  
Banten  -  -  620.3  290.9  -  -  207.4  132.9  
Central Java  183.8  384.8  354.2  327.6  908.3  1,159.7  1,017.5  662.2  
Yogyakarta  98.9  161.7  196.6  189.9  72.9  120.8  129.5  87.7  
East Java  203.2  328.6  186.0  250.2  570.6  647.3  529.0  344.3  
Bali  37.3  66.0  87.2  76.6  52.4  56.1  47.4  39.0  
West Nusa Tenggara  26.2  37.4  60.0  26.9  39.0  36.9  50.7  32.3  
East Nusa Tenggara  26.0  27.1  69.9  33.3  34.7  45.6  55.0  30.2  
West Kalimantan  39.4  43.8  49.2  16.4  28.4  44.7  45.7  33.0  
Central Kalimantan  49.7  78.8  124.4  31.5  16.0  37.0  24.9  47.3  
South Kalimantan  61.7  98.3  89.3  62.6  46.1  76.4  62.6  41.8  
East Kalimantan  112.6  194.5  155.5  149.3  20.3  68.2  42.8  47.5  
North Sulawesi  45.5  34.7  54.5  28.9  38.3  51.3  38.8  31.8  
Gorontalo  -  -  9.3  11.1  -  -  33.4  15.6  
Central Sulawesi  83.6  70.0  75.3  52.3  17.3  28.0  30.6  27.5  
South Sulawesi  65.2  119.5  79.8  103.2  147.9  161.1  169.7  139.3  
Southeast Sulawesi  51.0  71.1  110.3  40.7  29.6  36.7  22.3  30.7  
Maluku  46.9  68.7  18.7  9.6  27.0  38.9  92.8  30.4  
North Maluku  -  -  14.8  10.4  -  -  28.5  16.5  
Papua  33.4  73.8  63.8  51.6  16.2  31.6  30.2  33.9  
Total  3,724.6  5,224.8  5,536.3  3,929.6  3,557.9  5,149.8  5,440.2  3,756.3  
Source: a Compiled from Muhidin (2002), Table 2.21.  
b. Compiled and calculated from Badan Pusat Statistik, (2001), Table 12a.9.  
c. Compiled and calculated from Badan Pusat Statistik (2006a).  
 




Table 3.3. Types of Recent Migrants by Province: Indonesia, 1995-2000 
  
Number of Migrants  Percentage 












Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam  15,369  47,741 63,110 24.35 75.65  100.00 
North Sumatra  139,887  388,329 528,216 26.48 73.52  100.00 
West Sumatra  109,016  103,800 212,816 51.23 48.77  100.00 
Riau  526,711  333,001 859,712 61.27 38.73  100.00 
Jambi  109,534  74,510 184,044 59.52 40.48  100.00 
South Sumatra  163,250  136,807 300,057 54.41 45.59  100.00 
Bengkulu  68,832  27,568 96,400 71.40 28.60  100.00 
Lampung  149,013  278,907 427,920 34.82 65.18  100.00 
Bangka Belitung  36,536  5,938 42,474 86.02 13.98  100.00 
Jakarta  702,202  173,924 876,126 80.15 19.85  100.00 
West Java  1,097,021  979,997 2,077,018 52.82 47.18  100.00 
Central Java  354,204  673,355 1,027,559 34.47 65.53  100.00 
Yogyakarta  196,586  67,019 263,605 74.58 25.42  100.00 
East Java  185,966  597,411 783,377 23.74 76.26  100.00 
Banten  620,299  89,513 709,812 87.39 12.61  100.00 
Bali  87,225  96,957 184,182 47.36 52.64  100.00 
West Nusa Tenggara  59,964  56,858 116,822 51.33 48.67  100.00 
East Nusa Tenggara  69,910  77,656 147,566 47.38 52.62  100.00 
West Kalimantan  49,202  106,428 155,630 31.61 68.39  100.00 
Central Kalimantan  124,387  24,855 149,242 83.35 16.65  100.00 
South Kalimantan  89,320  93,576 182,896 48.84 51.16  100.00 
East Kalimantan  155,498  92,382 247,880 62.73 37.27  100.00 
North Sulawesi  54,504  43,602 98,106 55.56 44.44  100.00 
Central Sulawesi  75,328  87,028 162,356 46.40 53.60  100.00 
South Sulawesi  79,757  297,675 377,432 21.13 78.87  100.00 
Southeast Sulawesi  110,289  30,852 141,141 78.14 21.86  100.00 
Gorontalo  9,257  61,557 70,814 13.07 86.93  100.00 
Maluku  18,657  37,094 55,751 33.46 66.54  100.00 
North Maluku  14,764  42,871 57,635 25.62 74.38  100.00 
Papua  63,829  39,501 103,330 61.77 38.23  100.00 
TOTAL  5,536,317  5,166,712 10,703,029 51.73 48.27  100.00 
 



















  Immigrant Emigrant Immigrant Emigrant Immigrant Emigrant 
Aceh  2.25 1.29 1.88 1.68 1.00 9.56 
North Sumatra 1.22 2.51 1.21 3.08 1.37 3.45 
West Sumatra 3.14 5.20 3.60 4.88 2.90 6.02 
Riau 5.20 3.05 8.59 3.48 12.55 2.43 
Jambi 8.78 3.19 7.73 3.82 5.12 3.94 
South Sumatra 5.60 3.50 3.85 3.66 2.55 2.35 
Bengkulu 10.17 2.72 8.08 2.97 4.97 2.65 
Lampung 12.91 1.35 3.99 2.64 2.50 2.51 
       
Jakarta 13.55 7.46 11.08 13.14 9.20 10.92 
West Java 2.18 2.02 4.30 1.64 3.61 1.39 
Central Java 0.79 4.01 1.49 4.43 1.26 3.54 
Yogyakarta 3.82 3.00 5.97 4.57 6.79 4.58 
East Java 0.75 2.19 1.09 2.18 0.58 1.64 
Bali 1.67 2.41 2.57 2.23 3.05 1.68 
       
West Nusa Tenggara 0.99 1.71 1.21 1.28 1.76 1.50 
East Nusa Tenggara 1.00 1.49 0.85 1.62 2.12 1.67 
       
West Kalimantan 1.81 1.37 1.54 1.61 1.49 1.38 
Central Kalimantan 6.05 2.11 6.47 3.18 7.77 1.66 
South Kalimantan 3.38 2.63 4.18 3.36 3.34 2.36 
East Kalimantan 10.59 2.18 11.59 4.50 7.17 2.08 
       
North Sulawesi 2.43 2.12 1.52 2.29 1.86 2.19 
Central Sulawesi 7.52 1.72 4.64 1.95 4.26 1.77 
South Sulawesi 1.10 2.81 1.83 2.60 1.15 2.41 
Southeast Sulawesi 6.35 3.91 6.15 3.32 7.13 1.52 
       
Maluku 3.75 2.35 4.27 2.51 1.49 6.67 
Papua 3.41 1.79 5.12 2.38 4.31 2.09 
TOTAL 2.83 2.83 3.26 3.26 2.82 2.82 
Source: Population census (BPS) 1980, 1990, 2000. 
Note: Emigration rate is the ratio of emigrants to total population five years previously while Immigration rate 
is the ratio of immigrants to total population above five years old of age currently. 
 
 









Table 3.5.  Provincial Migration Rates, 1985, 1995, and 2005 (%) 
 
 1980-1985 1990-1995 2000-2005 
  Immigrant Emigrant Immigrant Emigrant Immigrant Emigrant 
Aceh  1.48 0.85 0.83 1.42 1.17 1.53 
North Sumatra  0.74 2.02 1.03 2.01 1.02 1.90 
West Sumatra  2.38 4.14 3.55 3.77 2.65 3.14 
Riau 4.2 2.17 4.28 3.7 6.76 1.86 
Jambi 3.56 2.2 2.69 2.52 2.81 2.19 
South Sumatra  2.29 2.44 2 2.9 1.04 1.57 
Bengkulu 4.15 1.79 5.25 2.94 2.33 2.14 
Lampung 2.52 1.71 1.93 2.78 1.42 1.71 
       
Jakarta  9.88 6.03 7.12 9.62 7.08 8.87 
West Java  2.1 1.33 3.17 1.31 2.05 1.04 
Central Java  0.72 2.51 1.3 2.7 1.11 2.23 
Yogyakarta  4.23 3.88 6.09 4.2 6.08 2.90 
East Java  0.6 1.2 1.31 1.33 0.75 1.03 
Bali  0.98 1.12 2.2 1.72 2.49 1.28 
       
West Nusa Tenggara 1.06 0.63 1.13 1.1 0.72 0.87 
East Nusa Tenggara 0.67 0.94 0.81 1.4 0.90 0.82 
       
West Kalimantan  0.81 0.78 1.35 1.06 0.45 0.90 
Central Kalimantan  3.52 1.96 2.51 2.95 1.81 2.69 
South Kalimantan  2.8 2.56 2.63 2.19 2.12 1.43 
East Kalimantan  6.52 2.47 6.75 3.83 5.87 1.94 
       
North Sulawesi  0.72 1.47 0.89 2.01 1.03 1.30 
Central Sulawesi  2.17 0.94 4.11 1.67 2.59 1.38 
South Sulawesi  0.8 1.55 1.84 2.22 1.36 1.83 
Southeast Sulawesi  7.46 1.47 3.97 2.85 2.35 1.78 
       
Maluku 1.75 1.83 1.25 2.49 0.95 2.34 
Papua 4.66 1.71 3.18 1.61 2.36 1.56 
TOTAL 1.95 1.95 2.39 2.39 1.94 1.94 
Source: SUPAS (BPS) 1985, 1995, 2005 
Note: Emigration rate is the ratio of emigrants to total population five years previously while Immigration rate 
is the ratio of immigrants to total population above five years old of age currently. The number for 
Aceh in 2005 is estimated based on the data of other provinces. 
 
 










Table 3.6.  Educations of Migrants, 1990 and 2000 
 
Source: Population census (BPS) 1990 and 2000. 
Note: The numbers in the table represent the average years of schooling for people above ten years of age. 
 
 
SOURCE: Vidyattama (2008: 257). 
 
 
  1985-1990 1990-2000 
  Population Emigrant Immigrant Population Emigrant Immigrant 
Aceh 4.63 7.39 7.47 5.95 6.35 7.56 
North Sumatra 5.05 8.06 7.57 6.14 8.29 7.37 
West Sumatra 4.69 8.05 6.87 5.57 8.26 7.47 
Riau 4.29 7.07 6.87 5.95 7.65 8.15 
Jambi 4.04 6.36 6.63 5.26 6.77 6.75 
South Sumatra 4.02 7.03 6.49 5.26 8.06 6.31 
Bengkulu 4.25 7.66 6.90 5.46 7.43 7.18 
Lampung 3.72 6.65 6.63 5.08 7.42 6.46 
       
Jakarta 7.13 7.72 7.93 8.37 9.11 8.85 
West Java 4.15 7.23 8.01 5.48 7.40 8.33 
Central Java 3.74 7.55 6.99 5.02 11.69 7.52 
Yogyakarta 5.14 9.69 9.34 6.58 9.49 10.57 
East Java 3.81 7.58 8.00 5.14 8.16 7.95 
Bali 4.44 8.83 8.63 5.88 7.20 8.71 
       
West Nusa Tenggara 3.03 8.65 8.78 3.90 7.22 6.74 
East Nusa Tenggara 3.19 7.84 8.60 4.04 7.77 6.44 
       
West Kalimantan 2.92 7.35 8.22 4.27 7.46 6.87 
Central Kalimantan 4.36 7.02 6.74 5.43 7.28 6.25 
South Kalimantan 4.09 6.96 7.04 5.08 7.11 7.12 
East Kalimantan 4.99 7.18 7.63 6.33 8.32 7.78 
       
North Sulawesi 4.86 8.89 8.29 6.02 8.02 8.13 
Central Sulawesi 4.40 7.52 6.95 5.27 7.31 6.14 
South Sulawesi 4.08 7.84 7.73 4.90 7.04 7.83 
Southeast Sulawesi 4.10 7.54 7.15 4.90 7.72 5.37 
       
Maluku 4.72 8.33 7.62 5.59 6.50 6.87 
Papua 3.44 7.80 7.95 4.28 8.09 7.23 
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Table 3.7.  Provincial Income per capita: Growth 1975- 2005 (%) 
 
 GRDP per capita 























Aceh 8.9 -1.3 3.5 7.5 -0.5 3.7 3.9 2.5 5.0 
North Sumatra  5.6 3.3 4.6 5.9 3.5 4.9 2.5 4.2 3.5 
West Sumatra  6.1 4.0 5.2 5.8 4.0 5.0 3.3 5.1 4.4 
Riau -4.4 -1.0 -2.9 2.8 1.7 2.3 1.2 3.1 2.3 
Jambi 2.7 3.4 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.9 4.3 5.0 4.7 
South Sumatra  2.3 2.8 2.5 2.9 3.4 3.1 2.6 4.0 3.4 
Bengkulu 5.7 2.4 4.3 5.6 2.4 4.2 0.2 3.7 2.3 
Lampung 4.5 3.4 4.1 4.5 3.3 4.0 4.5 3.5 3.9 
          
Jakarta  6.2 3.7 5.1 6.2 3.7 5.1 2.7 4.6 3.8 
West Java  5.5 2.6 4.2 5.7 3.0 4.5 4.0 3.4 3.7 
Central Java  6.6 2.9 5.0 6.6 2.9 5.0 2.8 4.8 4.0 
Yogyakarta  4.6 2.7 3.8 4.5 2.7 3.8 1.4 2.0 1.7 
East Java  6.0 2.9 4.6 5.9 2.9 4.6 5.8 3.9 4.6 
Bali  8.6 3.0 6.1 8.6 3.0 6.1 2.5 1.8 2.1 
          
West Nusa Tenggara 5.1 5.4 5.2 5.0 3.1 4.2 3.5 3.5 3.5 
East Nusa Tenggara 4.9 3.3 4.2 4.8 3.3 4.2 3.3 4.3 3.9 
          
West Kalimantan  5.5 2.5 4.2 5.5 2.5 4.2 4.5 2.2 3.1 
Central Kalimantan  5.5 1.5 3.8 5.5 1.5 3.7 2.0 3.8 3.1 
South Kalimantan  4.8 3.7 4.3 4.4 2.7 3.7 1.2 5.6 3.8 
East Kalimantan  3.3 1.8 2.6 5.8 1.6 4.0 0.2 4.6 2.8 
          
North Sulawesi  5.4 4.2 4.9 5.2 4.1 4.7 4.2 5.1 4.8 
Central Sulawesi  5.1 3.2 4.3 5.0 3.2 4.2 1.5 4.1 3.0 
South Sulawesi  5.3 3.6 4.6 5.1 3.5 4.4 3.6 4.2 3.9 
Southeast Sulawesi 6.1 2.3 4.4 7.3 2.2 5.1 1.9 2.2 2.1 
          
Maluku 5.3 -0.3 2.8 5.1 -0.1 2.8 2.1 2.6 2.4 
Papua 1.1 3.2 2.0 2.8 2.5 2.7 2.1 3.8 3.1 
Indonesia 4.7 2.6 3.8 5.9 2.8 4.5 3.6 3.9 3.8 
Source: Estimated from Regional Account by Industry and expenditure (BPS) based on 1993 constant price. 




SOURCE: Vidyattama (2008:  95).
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Table 4.1.  Annual Indonesian Workers Sent Overseas by Destination Economy: Indonesia, 2001-
2007  
 
No.  Economy of 
Destination  
2001a  2002a  2003a  2004a  2005a  2006b  2007c  
I. Asia 
1 Brunei Darussalam  5,773  8,502  1,146  6,503  4,978  7,431  4,321  
2 Singapore  34,295  16,071  6,103  9,131  25,087  28,545  23,613  
3 Hong Kong  23,929  20,431  3,509  14,183  12,143  19,211  21,282  
4 Taiwan  38,119  35,922  1,930  969  48,576  40,923  35,222  
5 Malaysia  110,490  152,680  89,439  127,175  201,887  207,426  151,998  
6 South Korea  3,391  4,273  7,495  2,924  4,506  5,959  2,175  
7 Thailand  6  1  0  0  0  0  0  
8 Srilanka  9  0  0  0  0  0  0  
9 Macau  na  na  na  na  na  na  102  
Total 216,012  237,880  109,622  160,885  297,177  309,495  238,713  
II. Middle East and Africa 
1 Saudi Arabia  103,235  213,603  169,038  196,342  150,235  268202  na  
2 Uni Emirate Arab  11,027  7,779  1,475  7,237  5,622  22190  na  
3 Kuwait  3,343  16,418  12,268  15,989  16,842  22630  na  
4 Bahrain  1,558  666  88  0  21  639  na  
5 Qatar  1,029  916  180  62  1,002  7546  na  
6 Jordan  379  1,233  226  68  2,081  10352  na  
7 Others*  609  1346  495  1  1216  4962  na  
Total 121,180  241,961  183,770  219,699  177,019  336,521  353,264  
III. Japan/Europe/USA  1,800  552  302  106  114  532  910  
Others  na  na  na  na  na  na  137  
Total  338,992  480,393  293,694  380,690  474,310  646,548  593,024  
Notes: a = Ananta and Arifin, 2007  
b = downloaded on 12 Nov 2007;  
c = downloaded on 12 February 2008  
* Others consists of those sent to Oman, Tunisia, Turkey etc.  





SOURCE: Ananta and Arifin (2008: 60)
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Table 4.2. Annual Indonesian Workers Sent Overseas by Destination Economy and Sex: 
2001 and 2005  
 
No. Economy of Destination 
2001 2005 
Male Female Male Female 
I. Asia 
1 Malaysia  44,260 66,230 126,706 75,181  
2 Singapore  3,397 30,898 0 25087  
3 Brunei Darussalam  1,582 4,191 2412 2566  
4 Hong Kong  2 23,927 2 12141  
5 Taiwan  2,418 35,701 4050 44526  
6 South Korea  2,814 577 4020 486  
7 Thailand  6 0 0 0  
8 Sri Lanka  9 0 0 0  
Sub-Total 54,488 161,524 137,190 159,987  
II. Middle East & Africa 
1 Saudi Arabia  9,817 93,418 11,367 138,868  
2  United Arab Emirate  268 10,759 101 5,521  
3  Kuwait  125 3,218 25 16,817  
4  Bahrain  2 1,556 5 16  
5  Qatar  28 1,001 154 848  
6  Jordan  29 350 0 2,081  
7  Others (Oman, Turkey, etc)  22 587 321 895  
Sub-Total  10,291 110,889 11,973 165,046  
Japan/Europe/USA  1,785 15 102 12  
Total  66,564 272,428 149,265 325,045  
Source : Compiled and calculated from Depnakertrans, Ditjen PPTKLN, 












Table 4.3. Foreign Workers by Citizenship: Indonesia, 2001-2004  
 
Country of Citizenship 
Number Percentage 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2001 2002 2003 2004  
1  America  2,465  2,476  1,606  1,580  10.14  9.63  8.85  7.90  
2  Australia  2,258  2,500  1,533  1,614  9.28  9.72  8.45  8.07  
3  Netherlands  541  494  350  344  2.22  1.92  1.93  1.72  
4  Hong Kong  128  108  71  36  0.53  0.42  0.39  0.18  
5  India  1,664  1,944  1,278  1,426  6.84  7.56  7.05  7.13  
6  United Kingdom  2,209  2,392  1,367  1,354  9.08  9.30  7.54  6.77  
7  Japan  3,700  3,640  2,644  3,451  15.21  14.16  14.58  17.25  
8  German  560  534  479  539  2.30  2.08  2.64  2.69  
9  South Korea  2,465  2,461  1,729  1,903  10.14  9.57  9.53  9.51  
10  Canada  786  877  532  429  3.23  3.41  2.93  2.14  
11  Malaysia  968  1,076  894  1,361  3.98  4.18  4.93  6.80  
12  Thailand  253  275  230  376  1.04  1.07  1.27  1.88  
13  France  684  782  516  460  2.81  3.04  2.84  2.30  
14  Philippine  949  1,011  817  860  3.90  3.93  4.50  4.30  
15  New Zealand  417  422  236  254  1.71  1.64  1.30  1.27  
16  Singapore  570  646  509  578  2.34  2.51  2.81  2.89  
17  Taiwan  1,090  1,056  677  750  4.48  4.11  3.73  3.75  
18  China  1,030  1,303  1,167  1,340  4.24  5.07  6.43  6.70  
Others 1,582 1,716  1,503  1,353  6.51  6.67  8.29  6.76  
Total 24,319 25,713  18,138  20,008  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  
Source : Ministry of Manpower & Transmigration, DG of Employment Training Development  
http://www.nakertrans.go.id/ENGLISHVERSION/expatriate.php, downloaded on 12 Feb 2008.  
 
 




Figure 4.1. Inflow of Remittances 












SOURCE:: Mboi and Smith (2006: 97) 
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Figure 5.1. Conflict-induced displacement in Indonesia 
(February 2000 – December 2003) 
 
 
Source: The Global IDP Project, 2004  
Note: This graph shows the variation of IDPs number from February 2000 to December 2003. The figures are 
based on the WFP/VAM Unit monthly "IDP Source and Recipient Regions" maps up to October 2002. The May 
2003 figures reflects the findings of the joint Bakornas PBP-OCHA missions conducted from December 2002 to 





Source of the following table and figures is IOM Jakarta Office, CTU Statistics, Dec 2008. 
 










Figure 5.2. Breakdown of VOTs based on gender 
 
 











Figure 5.5. Number of VOTs based on Destination where They were Trafficked 
 
